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Abstract
The present work introduces the main regulatory issues faced
nowadays in EU by policy-makers in the design of the elec-
tricity and natural gas markets. The dissertation consists of
the following parts:
Chapter 2 introduces the new challenges that are currently
engaging the European markets, under the perspective of the
stronger integration expected in the next years. The coordi-
nation of the investments in new facilities and the rules gov-
erning their access, the increasing need of flexible resources
as well as the integration of spot and forward markets will be
some of the themes examined in this first section.
Chapter 3 focuses on the regulatory interventions aimed at in-
crease the flexibility of the storage services in the Italian gas
market. A first part of the work is devoted to describe the
storage technologies, the services they provide and their cur-
rent regulatory framework. The rest of the chapter discusses
the main issues related to the elicitation of flexible resources
and the attraction of investments in new storage infrastruc-
tures.
Finally, chapter 4 builds a model of competition to study the
bidding strategies of the power generation firms in a day-
ahead electricity market based on zonal pricing. The analysis
shows the role that investments in the transmission network
may have on the degree of market competition, final prices
and social welfare.
xv
Abstract Chapter 2
This chapter introduces some of the new challenges that are
currently engaging the European energy markets, under the
perspective of the stronger integration expected in the next
years. The main issues are related to the interaction of mar-
ket mechanisms with regulatory targets. The stability and the
security of the energy supply, on one side, and the transition
towards more competitive and efficient markets, on the other,
impose to the involved actors the definition of priorities and
instruments aimed at preserving the goal of the creation of a
common European zone. This objective must be achieved in a
period characterized by the massive penetration of renewable
energy sources (RES). The themes of the better integration of
the spot and forward markets, the coordination of the invest-
ments in new facilities and the rule governing their access,
as well as, the increasing need of flexible balancing resources
will be examined throughout the chapter.
Abstract Chapter 3
This chapter studies which regulatory interventions can be
put to work to increase the flexibility of the storage services in
the Italian gas market. The first part of this work is devoted
to describe the storage technologies, the services they pro-
vide and their current regulatory framework, while the rest
of the chapter discusses the main issues related to the elicita-
tion of flexible resources and the attraction of investments in
new storage infrastructures. Two main proposals ensue from
this analysis. First, the Third-Party-Access (TPA) regime, at
which the storage operators are subject, may depress entry
in the storage industry to the extent that newcomers are not
able to recover the initial cost of the investment. Exemption
to TPA should than be granted on a case-by-case basis, but the
xvi
uncertainty about the regulatory regime introduces an addi-
tional risk for potential storage operators. In these situations,
the institution of a public regulated SSO (Storage System Oper-
ator), endowed with the monopoly of storage sites, may gen-
erate the required investments under the regulatory pressure.
Second, the current mechanism of Peak and Uniform capacity
allocation may enter in conflict with the security of supply to
final users if shippers are not able to predict prices accurately.
A complementary design based on the introduction of supply
option may reduce the risk for the shippers related to exces-
sive price volatility and provide the TSO with an adequate
amount of reserves for short-term modulation.
Abstract Chapter 4
This chapter introduces a model of competition to study the
bidding strategies of the power generating firms in a day-
ahead electricity market based on zonal pricing. In this
framework, two symmetric generators are located into two
separate geographical zones, linked together with a limited
capacity line, and compete in a multi-unit uniform price auc-
tion to supply electricity the day-ahead market. Two main
results derive from the model. First, even if players are sym-
metric, asymmetric strategies and allocation may emerge in
equilibrium. Second, a limited transmission capacity may
provide an incentive to firms to induce a congestion of the
power line in order to create an artificial monopoly and in-
crease revenues in their zone. For a firm this strategy is con-
ducted by increasing the price of its marginal unit above that
of the competitor, forcing the consumers located in its zone
to import electricity up to the point where the cable reaches
the transmission limit. At this point the generator acts as a
monopolist on the residual demand which remains unserved
by importations. In equilibrium, however, one of the two
xvii
players must have an incentive to not mimic its competitor
and decongesting the line. As a result the two zones separate
in net-importer and net-exporter and firms play asymmetric
mixed strategies. From a welfare perspective, an asymmetric
allocation in not socially efficient since total generation costs
are not minimized. Under certain conditions, the analysis in-
dicate a scope for policies aimed at increasing line’s transmis-
sion capacity in order to reduce the economic “withholding” of
power units and improve the social welfare.
xviii
Chapter 1
Introduction
The European energy markets are living a period of big challenges. The
need of switching to a low carbon economy and the integration of re-
newable energy sources (RES) into the current market design, the stabil-
ity and adequacy of the offer to final consumers (security of supply) and
the creation of a pan-European model for the development of the inter-
nal competitive market are the themes at the core of the political debate1.
The European targets created new rooms for the regulatory intervention
in the sector. The choice between a public subsidy and the creation of
market mechanisms for the development of RES, the determination of
the optimal market design for the remuneration of the investments in
new power plants or, alternatively, which regulation for the harmoniza-
tion of the congestion management are typical examples of the issues
currently faced by policy-makers in EU.
Despite of the big effort made by all the actors involved in the regu-
latory process2, Chapter 1 shows how the unification of the regulation at
EU level is still far from being complete and delays in the realization of
1To promote the debate and the coordination between the European national regula-
tory authorities, in 2009 the Third Energy Package adopted by the EU instituted the Agency
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).
2In February 2014 the launch of the pilot project of market coupling in 14 EU Member
represented an important step towards the unification of the day-ahead electricity markets
in the North-Western Europe.
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Figure 1: EU Natural Gas Imports in 2012
the essential facilities emerge within and across countries3. In particular,
delays in the development of the European networks for gas and elec-
tricity are detrimental not only to the achievement of the goal of market
unification but also for the security of supply and the diversification of
fuel importation routes. As showed in Figure 1 below, in 2012 the Euro-
pean gas importations came mainly from Norway (35% of total imports),
Russia (34%) and Algeria (14%). In 2030 the European Commission fore-
casted that 80% of EU natural gas needs will come from importations.
In this perspective, new investments in pipelines, LNG terminals and
storage tanks may serve to the scope of reducing the dependency from
the historical partners of EU and increasing long-distance importation of
gas (for example USA4 and South America).
Geopolitical tensions are not the only issues deriving by the lack of
3In the document of 15th November 2012 the European Commission indicated the 2014
as the year for the realization of the internal market.
4As several analysts argue, given the increasing production of USA shale-gas “[. . . ]The
United States is expected to go from a net importer of natural gas to a net exporter by 2020” (see
(62))
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adequate and coordinated investments in network capacity. The mas-
sive penetration of the intermittent and distributed generation, occurred
in the last years in the electricity sector, introduced an additional source
of instability in the EU system. First, the existence of small generating
units connected directly to the distribution (low voltage) rather than the
transmission (high voltage) power grid imposes a higher coordination
between the subjects responsible for the management of the entire net-
work. In this perspective, studies aimed at understanding how to in-
crease the responsiveness of the demand to price variations and the de-
sign of dynamic and adaptive networks (smart grids) are assuming a
central role in the public and scientific debate. Second, the possibility of
short-term variations on the supply side requires the existence of flexible
resources (reserves) able to cover unbalances between demand and sup-
ply in the real time. This not only reveal the high potentiality related to
the development of grid-scale electricity storage technologies (batteries),
but also shows how the interdependence between natural gas and elec-
tricity markets is increased, since real time unbalances in the electricity
production are directly transferred to the upstream market for the fuel.
In Italy, almost 70% of the power production comes from the ther-
moelectric sector while natural gas amounts to 65% of the total produc-
tion. Endowed with limited internal resources, Italy, the third highest
European consumer of natural gas5, imports the majority of gas for its
consumption from abroad (in 2012 the percentage of imports on total
consumption was around 97%6). The increasing of the liquidity of the
spot market (PSV hub) helped to reduce the long-run dependency from
external sources, generally based on long-term contracts with Take-Or-
Pay clause7, and provided additional tools for short-term modulation of
the consumption. Notwithstanding, the Italian gas system is centered
on its storage reserves. These are used to respond both to seasonal and
short-term variations of the demand and production as well as for the
real-time physical balancing of the grid by the TSO (Transmission System
5Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013 and Eurogas.
6Source: see supra note 5.
7These contracts, generally inflexible, impose to the shippers very high renegotiation
costs.
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Operator). Shocks in the gas demand following, for instance, an instan-
taneous increase of CCGT (combined cycle gas turbine) consumption as
a response to unexpected collapses of the electricity production from re-
newables, are compensated by making use of the gas reserve available
into the system. However, the “flexibility” of the gas in stock depends
on the storage site and its technical characteristics8, as well as by the reg-
ulation for accessing the infrastructure and its services. These arguments
are the subjects of the second chapter of this work. While the first part
of chapter 2 describes the technology of gas stockpiling and the techni-
cal characteristics and costs of storage sites, the second part discusses
the regulation currently adopted in Italy for the remuneration of the in-
vestments in essential facilities, the access to the infrastructures and the
market mechanisms for the allocation of the storage capacity among the
shippers. The analysis conducted shines a light on some of the criticali-
ties that affects the Italian gas market and, in particular, those related to
the application of the TPA (Third-Party-Access) regime for accessing the
storage facilities and the conflicting coexistence of market mechanisms
with system security targets for the allocation of the storage capacity. As
chapter 2 shows, there is a scope for a direct public intervention for the
realization of the infrastructures and for the introduction of mechanisms
aimed at enhancing market competition yet preserving the security of
supply.
Investments for the development of the network are ultimately fun-
damental to the promotion of a competitive European industry, expected
to reduce the cost of energy to final consumers. In the wholesale electric-
ity markets, a limited capacity of transmission between different geo-
graphic zones not only reduce the access to potential entrants (creating
de facto regional monopolies) but, also, may induce strategic behaviors
aimed at sustaining artificial higher prices for final consumers. While the
economic literature focused extensively on the strategic bidding of the
generation companies (gen.co.) in the day-ahead market9 and the most
8The main parameters include the withdrawal and injection rates and the space capac-
ity.
9See, for instance, the model proposed by (65) and (36)or, more recently, (22) or (43).
As chapter 3 will describe, the main debate in the literature is related to the definition of
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(socially) efficient market mechanism for the allocation of the transmis-
sion rights10, less has been said about how transmission capacity affects
the supply strategies of the firms.
(13) provided an important contribution to this area of research with
the introduction of a Cournot model of competition where firms, located
in two zones connected by a power line with a limited transmission ca-
pacity, compete to supply electricity in the same day-ahead market. Built
on this network configuration, chapter 3 constructs a multi-unit auction
model where firms are asked to submit to the power exchange a step
supply function, containing a finite number of pair price-quantity, in a
day-ahead market based on zonal pricing. The zonal pricing, assumed as
the pricing method model in Europe, divides the (commercial) network
in more zones and, for any couple of zones, generates different prices if
the power lines are congested (i.e. the network constraints are binding).
If no congestion on the grid occurs the price is, instead, unique on the
entire territory11.
The contribution of the analysis developed in chapter 3 is the inclu-
sion in a basic theoretic model of a set of business rules closer to those
currently adopted in EU by several power exchanges. If, on the one hand,
this alternative approach is able to reproduce some of the results already
present in the literature as, for instance, the adoption of mixed asym-
metric strategies by the firms or the definition of a transmission capacity
target for policy-makers, on the other, the model can be further general-
ized and easier applied to real market situations to forecast firms bidding
strategies. This last aspect would be source of future research in the field,
with the intent of evaluating regulatory interventions aimed at harmo-
nizing the business rules in EU12 and the dynamics of the investments
the most appropriate approach for modelling the supply curve submitted by the firms for
their power plants.
10Several authors studied the differences between the adoption of the uniform price
auction (or system marginal pricing) and the pay-as-bid auction for the selling of power in
the day-ahead market - see for instance (31; 32).
11An alternative format is the “nodal” pricing adopted by the PJM (USA) where the price
is computed for each bus on the grid.
12Consider for instance, the market priority for the dispatching of renewables adopted
in some countries to facilitate new investments or a revision of the zonal partition of the
5
undertaken by the TSOs.
transmission grid.
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Chapter 2
The New Challenges of the
European Electricity and
Gas Markets
2.1 Introduction
In the recent years new challenges emerged for the European energy
markets. These are principally related to the development of an Euro-
pean common market for electricity and gas and, to the same extent, to
the integration of the renewable sources (RES) and Distributed Genera-
tion (DG)1 in the energy systems. Notwithstanding the great advantages
expected for all the community and in particular for final consumers,
the integration of the European market proves to be a difficult task for
several reasons. First, each member state has a different organization
and regulation of its internal market, which varies a lot among coun-
tries. Therefore, the establishment of largely accepted settings require a
big effort for the definition of the resources, the actors and the regula-
tory framework for operators. Secondly, the creation of a common mar-
1The Distributed Generation (DG) refers to the production of power from small scale
generators, decentralized on the national territory and connected to the medium and low
voltage grid.
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ket zone stands on the ability of the systems to generate incentives for
developing the essential infrastructural facilities within the entire sup-
ply chain: production, transmission, distribution and storage. Finally,
the massive penetration of the renewable capacity and distributed gen-
eration introduces new difficulties that directly impact on the stability of
the European systems. Both electricity and gas markets are than required
to quickly adapt and generate flexible resources to assure the security of
supply to final users. This adaptation is more complicated in the elec-
tricity industry, since power cannot be cheaply and easy stored. As a
result, system stability asks for a higher coordination between gas and
power sectors, both in the short and the long term, with the intent of in-
creasing the value of future investments. Holding the perspective of the
progressive unification of the European markets, these arguments will
be discussed in the next sections as follow: first, the main obstacles to
the achievement of a single European energy market and the expected
regulatory interventions will be treated; successively, the major debates
and trends in the electricity and gas sectors are described and analyzed.
Despite of the strong correlation between gas and electricity, the analysis
of the two sectors is conducted separately. This is motivated by the need
of preserving the specificity of the interventions in the two industries.
2.2 Market Integration
The Energy policy is at the core of the EU integration. The third energy
package (2009/72/CE and 2009/73/CE), that entered into force in 2009,
imposed on the member states the achievement of several targets for
their internal market. These are principally devoted to increase market
competition, assure (at least) a legal unbundling between energy trans-
mission and production and increase consumers protection.
Notwithstanding important measures have been adopted inside the
member states, there is still much to do to integrate the markets into a
single European system. Indeed, the European markets are still charac-
terized by a regional dimension with different degrees of liquidity and a
great variety of products exchanged. This motivated the EU Commission
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to intervene in the last years with policies principally oriented to guar-
antee a non discriminatory access to the essential facilities and attracting
new investments into the sectors, with the scope of increase the liquidity
inside the markets. These conditions have been recognized as a prereq-
uisite for delivering the benefits of liberalization to final consumers.
As highlighted by the European Commission (hereafter: EC)2, the
non discriminatory access to the infrastructure represents a major con-
cern, since the historical advantages of the former monopolists can act
as a barrier to entry. This may inhibit both EU and extra-EU operators
to enter the wholesale and retail markets. To deal with this possibility,
two directives of EC3 gave the possibility to the countries to choose be-
tween a regulated or negotiated third party access (TPA) to the infrastruc-
ture recognized as essential facilities (high-voltage electricity transmis-
sion, high-pressure pipelines, gas storage site, etc. . . ). The option that
has been adopted across Europe however is not uniform, introducing
so an additional source of complexity towards markets unification. (24)
argues that, for a country, the choice of one mechanism rather than the
other can be motivated by the degree of maturity reached by its internal
market. Indeed, in a market characterized by a high level of competition
the negotiated access to the infrastructure can be viewed as a desirable
market-oriented approach. The cost for accessing the infrastructure so
should reflect the effective willingness to pay of the operators in pres-
ence of scarcity of the resource (congestion). In a regulated TPA, instead,
the regulator is charged with the task of defining the optimal tariff for
the utilization of the facility. The determination of the tariff may (largely)
differ across countries according, among the others, to the ownership of
the facility (private or public nature), the incentive scheme adopted for
investor remuneration and the presence of alternative resources for op-
erators (for instance, interconnection vs. storage capacity). The harmo-
nization of the tariff plans, both at wholesale and retail level, becomes so
a crux point for the definition of a single trading area. An effort in this
2see (29).
3Directive 2009/72/EC (the “Electricity Directive”) and Directive 2009/73/EC (the
“Gas Directive”).
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sense has been made, for instance, in gas markets, with the Entry-Exit
tariff plan for pipeline transportation. However, as markets liquidity
is expected to increase in the next years, negotiation can be thought as
more reflective of the operators’ willingness to pay, inspiring than the in-
troduction of market mechanisms for the allocation of the resources (ex.
auctions).
Markets integration and development cannot disregard from the pro-
motion of new investments in generation (production) and infrastruc-
tures. This is more than an issue in an area, the EU, where the supply is
strongly dependent from external fuels. In the electricity sector, most Eu-
ropean countries are investing in generation capacity, especially driven
by the quick transition to renewable sources. In particular between 2005
and 2010 renewables reached the installed capacity of 288 GW4. Despite
the great result achieved, the target of increasing the renewable capacity
of 487 GW in 20205 remains far away. In fact, according to the notifi-
cation arrived at the European Commission of planned investments in
RES, only 40 GW are expected to enter the markets in the coming years6.
In this context, large differences in generation capacity are still surviving
among the member states. Indeed, it is difficult to find similar trends in
all countries, exacerbating the need for a common European program. If,
on the one hand, some countries record a structural situation of overca-
pacity in the power generation from fossil fuels (oil, gas and carbon), as
for instance Italy, other countries are instead experiencing a boost in the
investment for the generation from these sources (for instance Greece,
UK, Spain and Germany). Major investments are also expected in the
next years in nuclear energy in, among the others, UK, France, Finland
and Sweden.
If integration is expected to contribute to the savings for final con-
4Source: (30).
5This is recognized as the target by the EC Project Horizon 2020.
6Source: see supra note 14. However, as indicated by the EC, the data published can
underestimate the real amount of renewable capacity installed in EU-27. The document
reports that “The gap is probably explicable by the thresholds set in Regulation 617/2010 (reporting
threshold set at 10 MW for photovoltaic projects and 20 MW for wind parks). This resulted in an
underestimation of current capacity and future investment in electricity generation from renewables,
as this type of investment is usually small-scale”.
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sumers, the lack of coordination among member state may have, given
the long-run returns of investments, the effect of crowding out part of
generation capacity. This aspect, together with additional factors that
typically impact the electricity industry, has been one of the reason that
led most countries to design mechanisms aimed at assuring an adequate
level of capacity (Capacity Market). These tools are at the center of an in-
tense debate in Europe regarding their opportunity and implementation
within the current electricity market architectures.
Along with generation capacity, additional infrastructural invest-
ments are expected to bring final benefits in the coming years. As it
has been estimated by the EC, Europe’s energy system requires invest-
ments for 210 billion Â€ by 20207. These are devoted to (i) improving the
high voltage electricity transmission and increasing the electric storage
capacity and smart grid applications, (ii) improving the high pressure
gas transmission and increasing gas storage capacity and LNG termi-
nals. From EC’s estimations, it emerges that the volume of investments
for the period 2011-2020 will need to increase by 30% for gas and 70% for
electricity compared to current levels.
With regard to the gas sector, a key role is attributed to new in-
vestments in LNG terminals. The reduction of internal gas production
and, consequently, the increase of the energy dependence from extra-EU
countries make investments in LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) extremely
important. Currently, around 20% of European gas importation is in the
form of LNG. In 2010 the European import dependency comes mainly
from Russia (35%), Norway (27%) and Algeria (14%). The diversification
of energy sources must be accompanied by the development of adequate
storage capacity. Indeed, even if the supply flow can be assumed to be
quite stable during the year, the demand varies over time and storage
is fundamental to respond quickly to these variations. However not all
the facilities have the same degree of flexibility. As discussed in (5) the
higher injection rates are associated with salt caver or LNG peak shav-
ing. These facilities permit to rapidly cover hourly peaks and allow for a
flexible modulation of the flows. Currently in Europe around 69% of gas
7Source: see supra note 14.
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storage is in depleted fields, 19% in acquifer, 10% in Salt cavities and 2%
in above ground storage (LNG peak shaving facilities). As expressed by
the EC, while “current EU storage capacity seems sufficient to cover seasonal
demand, tight supply demand situations may appear in some regions due to the
uncertainty of future gas demand and the uncertainty of the planned invest-
ments”8.
To monitor the progress made in the realization of the investments,
the member states will need to achieve a more efficient data exchange.
The instrument adopted to accomplish with this goal is the Ten-Year
Network Development Plans (TYNDP’s) instituted by the European Net-
work of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and Gas (ENTSO-
E and ENTSO-G). The target of these documents is to improve the ex-
change of data and defining models for the development of the grid in
a pan-European perspective. These documents result to be more impor-
tant in as much as they provide a combined view on the development of
the networks for electricity and gas. The important role played by gas-
fired power plants and the massive renewables penetration of the last
years ask for a closer relationship between gas and electricity market.
The reason is related to the need of flexible production to face the higher
volatility imposed by the intermittent capacity. Being the natural gas the
main source for electricity production in most European countries, an
imminent variation of electricity demand or supply have repercussions
on the upstream market for fuel. Part of the flexibility asked to electric-
ity production is transferred to the gas market, which must be endowed
of flexible resources as well. This closer relation impacts importantly on
the market variables both in the short and in the long run. In the short
term, the price for the use of flexibility resource is expected to emerge in
one or both markets, according to the inter-sector elasticity, while in the
long-term this has an impact on the geography of the investment and the
security of supply.
Two further considerations are centered on the overcoming of the ad-
ministrative tariffs to final consumers and the improvement of the en-
ergy efficiency. The termination of regulated tariffs has been recognized
8See (30).
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by the EC as one of the main goal for the realization of mature energy
markets. The main reasons can be summarized in these two points: first,
price signals and investments must be driven by the competitive forces
rather than a central definition of the costs for all consumers; second,
regulated tariffs depress entry in the market if not cost reflective, reducing
so the attractiveness for the consumers to switch to other operators. The
tariffs may, for instance, be set too low (below the market cost), making
real competition impossible. To ride this problem out, the demand must
play an active role on the determination of the equilibrium prices and
quantities, which currently is prevented by the absence of adequate tools
for observing and responding to price variation (smart meters).
Finally, an important scope of European policies is the improvement
of the energy efficiency. The target of 20% reduction of CO2 in 2020 has to
be pursued by the national plans for energy efficiency and supervised by the
EC. In this scenario a key role is assigned to new technologies that will
be able to reduce energy consumption (e.g. smart meters) and energy
production (e.g. cogeneration, zero-emission buildings).
2.3 The Challenges of the Electricity Markets
The European energy markets are divided in a spot market and in a for-
ward market. In the electricity spot market the power is negotiated with
the day of delivery close to the real time. The spot market is generally
organized in a primary market, that run before the day of delivery (day-
ahead) and a secondary market, that allows generators to successively ad-
just their position. To complement the design, the network manager ac-
quires the resources for balancing the grid in real time on the ancillary
service market. All these markets may include sub-stages that run in dif-
ferent periods in time. In the forward market the operators trade power
with a future delivery (e.g. weekly, monthly, yearly). In both cases (spot
or forward) the transactions may occur on regulated or non regulated
platform (Over the Counter - OTC). In the regulated spot market a Power
Exchange determines for each relevant period (e.g. hourly or half-hour)
of the delivery day the equilibrium prices and quantities, according to
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Figure 2: Comparisons of monthly electricity baseload prices in regional
electricity markets
Source: EC Quarterly Report on European Electricity Market - 3rd and 4th quarters
2012.
some allocation mechanism, with the most common being the pay-as-bid
and the marginal pricing auction. By looking at the spot prices realized
across Europe, it appears clear the segmentation of the European elec-
tricity industry at regional level. Figure 2 shows the prices realized on
the European power exchanges from 2009 to 2012.
From the figure it is possible to appreciate the price spread across Eu-
rope. For instance, the spread in 2012 between IPEX (Italian Power Ex-
change) and NordPool9 (Nordic Country) for the baseload product was
around 45 Â€/MWh. Notwithstanding the different dynamics of con-
sumption (seasonal peaks reached in July for Italy while in December for
Nordic Countries), there is a substantial disparity of prices among the re-
gions. This differentiation can be interpreted as the combination of two
factors: significant differences in generation capacity technologies across
states and a limited interconnection capacity.
9The Nord Pool is the power exchange operating in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Fin-
land, Estonia and Lithuania and represents the most liquid market in Europe.
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The generation park determines which technology meets the demand
at the margin. Despite the strong penetration of the renewable genera-
tion, characterized by the lowest marginal cost, the strong dependence
on gas in some countries (for instance Italy and UK) determined a cor-
relation between electricity and gas prices. Such a relation is relaxed in
those area where a large part of the off-peak demand is satisfied by nu-
clear generation (France and Nordic Countries) or hydroelectric power
(Nordic Countries). Figure 4 in Appendix shows the trends between the
fossil fuels price index and the electricity price index from 2002 to 2012.
As one can observe, the correlation between power prices and the long-
term gas contracts decreased in the last two years, highlighting the effect
of the massive penetration of renewables and, how it will be discussed in
the next section, the increase of the liquidity of gas spot markets, where
operators are able to trade gas in a more flexible way compared to long-
term agreements. Coherently with the price differentials observed in
EU, the physical (and commercial) flows on the grid show the attitude
of countries in dividing in net importer and net exporter. Figure 5 in
Appendix shows the monthly cross-border physical power flows in the
EU-27 from the end of 2009 to 2012. It emerges clearly the net exporting
position of the central western Europe (CW), as opposed to the South
Eastern Europe (especially from the second part of 2011) and Italy.
In a marginal pricing system, the absence of any connection limita-
tion (unlimited cross-border capacity) will determine the same price in
all markets. In fact, generators located in any part of the continent will
compete in the same market and the price they would receive will be de-
termined by the last offer, in the economic merit order, needed to meet
demand at the margin. The limited interconnection among countries
reduces the room for generators located in a member state to trade in
other spot markets. This create the need for grid managers to allocate
this scarce resource (cross border capacity) to operators located in differ-
ent member states in a non discriminatory and efficient way. Currently
this is done by using auction for trans-border capacity that are run by an
independent organization at a supranational level10. The key issue be-
10See www.casc.eu
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comes than the definition of the efficient mechanism for the allocation of
the capacity. At the moment two are the options that have been widely
employed: the explicit allocation and the implicit allocation. An explicit
allocation represents a capacity, in terms of physical transmission rights,
directly assigned to the operators before the power delivery period. These
rights can be allocated with products that may vary with respect to the
time of delivery (monthly, yearly, weekly, etc. . . ) and with different sea-
sonal modularity (flat or flexible contract). An implicit allocation, instead,
assigns physical rights simultaneously with the power trade in the spot
market. Practically this means that the spot markets of each member
state must run exactly the same allocation model – the algorithm - in
each relevant period of the delivery day. In other words, the implicit al-
location treats alternative spot markets as a unique competing zone. This
second allocation is also known as Market Coupling. In terms of com-
mercial flows, the market coupling provides always an efficient solution
since, in case of congestion, the power on the frontier follows the price
spread, if any, that realizes on the different nodes of the grid. Compared
to the explicit allocation, however, the market coupling requires a higher
level of integration and the adoption of the same algorithm for clearing
the internal market. The market coupling can be centralized or decentral-
ized. In the first case the market run only once, in any relevant period,
and the commercial flows are subject to all the network constraints that
apply to the two original zones involved into the coupling. In the second
case the two zones run (contemporaneously) their internal market and
network constraints are considered separately. Despite the final alloca-
tion is the same, the flow of information differs according to the type of
solution adopted.
The massive Renewables penetration occurred in the recent years chal-
lenges the stability of the interconnected power systems. In 2010 the
percentage of renewables on the total European capacity was around
20%11, but this value is expected to increase in the next years. According
to the investments notified by member states, the UK, the Netherlands,
Lithuania, Estonia and Cyprus will more than double their existing ca-
11Source: See supra note 14.
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pacity for electricity generation from renewables. The intermittence of
this production and its high volatility implies the use of resources for
balancing the grid that must be flexible enough to meet instantaneous
variation of demand. This is particularly important in those hours when
photovoltaic (PV) generation falls down simultaneously with a peak in
demand (generally late evening hours) or in those areas where wind gen-
eration is particularly concentrated, for instance, during the night and in
the early morning hours. Given the high cost connected to power stor-
age, on the one side, the transmission system operators (TSOs) are forced
to acquire more flexible resources for balancing the grid in the ancillary
market. This represents a major cost for the system, especially if some
resource that were previously turned off, i.e. with no injections sched-
uled as resulting from the spot market, must be activated. On the other
side, the effect on the spot market of the increased renewable generation
is the “crowding out” of programmable thermoelectric production, since
the marginal cost of the former results to be sensibly lower. This in turn
reduces the reserves available to the TSOs for rapid balancing operation
and increases the cost for the system (for instance, related to the agree-
ment for load shedding). The regime of subsidies, direct or indirect, that
has been pursued in EU so has to pay attention to the consequences that
this may have on the stability of the systems. The process of subsidy re-
vision asked by the EC has the target to propose a better harmonization
of the different form of intervention and reduce the distortion for final
consumers, who finally share the cost of the public intervention and the
alteration of market competition.
The contemporaneous integration of renewable capacity, that looks
down the spot prices, and the increase of the risk related to its intermit-
tency, that reducing the adaptability of the systems to extreme demand
fluctuations (system adequacy) generates instead price peaks, represents
for the producers a major source of uncertainty about future returns.
Given the long times required for the completion of power plants, such
uncertainty may discourage investments in power generation, giving
rise to the classic “boom and bust” cycle in the power industry. Indeed,
during periods of scarcity of available capacity, price peaks are more fre-
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quent and attract new investments, while when spot prices are too low
the investments are stagnant (“missing money” problem12). When scarcity
appears, however, the lack of coordination among producers impose a
“prudential” investment, with the result that the new total capacity will
fall below the social optimal level. For these reasons, the regulatory
debate in Europe is focusing on the opportunity of introducing regula-
tions aimed at integrating energy-only markets (where costs are recovered
from energy and operating reserves) with non-discriminatory mecha-
nisms for the remuneration of the capacity (capacity markets). Among the
forms of intervention considered it can be mentioned the capacity pay-
ments (fixed or variable payment awarded to all/part of the capacity de-
clared/actually available), capacity auction (where the TSO launches sev-
eral years before delivery an auction and selects at least cost resources to
satisfy projected peakload demand) and reliability option (where the ca-
pacity options that are auctioned give right to reimbursement if the spot
price exceeds some contractual price). The design of non discriminatory
and non-distortionary mechanisms for assuring adequate available ca-
pacity to the systems will be at the core of the next regulatory European
interventions.
With regard to forward markets, the current situation in Europe shows
large differences: very liquid and integrated markets, as those in North-
ern Europe13, live together with younger markets, as for instance the
IPEX and OMIP (the Spanish Power Exchange). Figure 3 shows the vol-
umes traded on the main power exchanges in the period 2007-2012.
From the figure above it is possible to appreciate the different degree
of development of the forward markets in Europe. The volume traded
in the Nord Pool is the highest in Europe while the Mediterranean area
is the less liquid, although Spain and Italy are experiencing low growth
rates. Forward markets are regarded as an important instruments by op-
erators since they permit to diversify their selling (and buy) strategies,
hedging from the risk of the spot price volatility and channel the expec-
12The “missing money” problem is brightly described in (20).
13As for instance the Nord Pool and the APX-ENDEX (the Power Exchange operating
in Netherlands, UK and Belgium).
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Figure 3: Volumes traded on the main forward markets in 2007-2012
Source: GME (Italian Power Exchange- IPEX), Annual Report 2012
tations about future prices. For these reasons their complete evolution is
perceived as an essential part of the liberalization process and is central
in the energy polices of (several) member states.
The complete harmonization of European markets passes through
new investments in the relevant infrastructures. Following market lib-
eralization, a first issue for European countries was the choice of which
paradigm for the management of the power networks. For high-voltage
transmission, European members opted for the creation of a regulated
TSO who is responsible for managing the grid and is unbundled with
the production activity. A TSO, differently from an ISO (Independent
System Operators), owns the network and makes the relevant invest-
ments in transmission. In addition, it offers the service of grid balancing
(minimizing the cost for the system), guaranteeing a non discriminatory
access to market operators. However, there is no uniformity on the entity
and the number of TSO that are entitled of managing the network inside
each power system. Most European countries opted for the definition
of a natural monopoly where the remuneration of the TSO is set by an
independent regulator.
In the market based approach the TSO is provided with the instru-
ments for dispatching the energy on the grid directly from the genera-
tors admitted to participate to the ancillary service market. There is not an
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univocal design that defines the instruments that can be used by the TSO
and which products must be offered by producers. The task for the Eu-
ropean regulation than is the definition of the resources available on the
ancillary market as well as the relevant time (e.g. hour or half-hour) for
the computation of operators unbalances. The big challenge in this sense
is represented by the adoption of an European Network Code, preliminary
the creation of a common balancing area, that defines the services that
can be offered by operators also outside the country where the grid un-
balance occurs.
2.4 The Challenges of the Gas Markets
The European gas systems are living a period of deep change, character-
ized by a faster transition from a “rigid” market structure, grounded on
the cornerstone of system stability protection and security of supply, to-
wards a wide liberalization process, intended to introduce new actors
and increase efficiency and competiveness. This required the harmo-
nization of EU regulation and the adoption of a variety of interventions
with the scope of increasing the regional cooperation. Among the sev-
eral activities that are currently involving the member states, it is worth
to mention the implementation of the Network Code on Capacity Allocation
Mechanism (CAM NC), aimed at introducing rules for the management of
trans-border capacities and legally binding starting from 2015. Gas TSOs
and regulators (convened in Europe within the agency for the cooper-
ation of energy regulators – ACER) are appointed, among the others,
for the design of the allocation mechanism, the definition of the prod-
ucts and the development of IT platforms. With regards to the capacity
allocation mechanism, EU regulators opted for the introduction of com-
petitive auctions and defined the rules for the determination of the total
capacity auctioned by TSOs. The allocation gives the physical right to
the shipper to deliver gas in some of the nodes (entry and exit points)
of the European network. In order to recover the operating costs for
the transportation, the auctions should include an entry fee (reservation
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Table 1: Traded Volumes on the main European Gas Hubs (GWh)
Source: GME (Italian Power Exchange – Annual Report), 2012
price), based on the Entry-Exit tariffs14 for accessing the network. The
additional revenues of the auctions than can be used to reduce final con-
sumers bill or invested in network development. The code, together with
the regulation on the congestion management procedure (CMP), is expected
to provide signals to operators about the value of accessing the grid in
presence of limited capacity.
European gas markets are organized at what is defined the virtual
hubs. The latter represents a virtual point of exchange, generally located
in between an entry and exit point on the transmission grid, aimed at
reproducing in a simplified model the (meshed) network. The current
picture of the European hubs includes very liquid markets, that benefits
from the proximity to production sites, as for instance Zeebruge (Bel-
gium), TTF (the Netherlands) and NBP (UK) and hubs with a lower de-
gree of liquidity, as for instance, PEG (France) and CEGH (Austria). The
volumes of the main European hubs are indicated in Table 115:
Notwithstanding the large differences surviving across the member
states, it is possible to get a glimpse of the ongoing process of conver-
gence occurring in the recent years. In some hubs, as for instance PSV
(Italy) and CEGH, transactions are increasing, revealing so the higher
trading propensity of the operators. The spreading of gas markets has
important consequences on the refueling and amount of resources that
are available to the shippers (gas supplier). These can be summarized
in the reduction of the take-or-pay (TOP) share of shippers supply con-
14For a discussion about the tariffs for the access to the transmission grid the reader can
see (45) or (4).
15The volumes indicated in the picture are those traded outside the regulated markets
(OTC). Non regulated markets include, indeed, the great majority of transactions contrarily
to the more recent regulated spot markets.
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tracts and in the increase of system flexibility through real time trade.
In fact, the diversification of gas sources permits to reduce the risks and
costs for the shippers related to short term demand variations. These
are generally expected to be high because when shippers cannot adjust
their position into the market, the gas which is offered has generally
a flat modularity, in accordance with the long-term clause that shippers
signed with non-EU exporter (Take-or-Pay or TOP clause). These agree-
ments generally include the option for a shipper to withdrawal gas up
to fixed amount under the payment of a fixed price. The price must be
paid independently by the decision to take or not the gas from the grid.
Therefore, these contacts results to be “rigid” to demand variations, de-
termining so a big cost for the shippers for varying their supply strate-
gies. Moreover, as showed in some works16, these clause can generate
also anti-competitive effect, to the extent that the transmission grid is
“overbooked” by those operators conditioned on TOP.
The progresses made by EU markets alleviates also the troubles de-
riving from the increasing need of flexible resources for electricity produc-
tion. Shippers, indeed, can contract the gas close to the day of delivery,
reducing the uncertainty about future demand. As discussed in the pre-
vious section, the higher volatility in the electricity production deriving
from the transition to low CO2 emission systems, implies a higher coor-
dination between power generation and the supply of fossil fuels. This
generates an additional variable on firms’ decision to invest in traditional
power plants. Indeed, a firm can decide to build a new generator close to
where the commodity is abundant in the market, or alternatively, to use
intensively the transmission network to bring the fuel to the plant. This
decision depends on the transmission cost, the possibility to access the
grid and the availability of “speedy” resources in the fuel market.
An important source of flexibility is already available in the transmis-
sion network. These reserves (line-pack) are generally used for balancing
purpose (buffering). However, the shippers can be unbalanced and use
this stock for trading in the spot market. Being the line-pack a scarce
resource, dependent on the volume of gas inside the pipelines, there is
16For instance, (60).
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a problem related to its allocation. The unbalances of the shippers are
adjusted in the gas balancing market, where the TSO buys or sells gas to
correct the overall system unbalance. The balancing price should there-
fore reflect the value for the operators of the utilization of gas, including
line-pack, in the real time. However, the current design of balancing mar-
kets do not allow to observe the real-time price of gas and some time is
left to the shippers for adjusting their position, after which the balancing
price is determined. In this case the final price for the utilization of line-
pack reserves may reveal to be not cost-reflective. In fact, some operators
may have convenience to overusing pipeline reserves when their value
(in the spot market) is high and reduce their unbalances only when the
unbalance price is expected to be low. The balancing time thus is still an
open issue. If on the one hand, hourly balancing can be considered very
costly for the shippers and reduce the possibility to arbitrate in the spot
market, on the other hand, end-of-the-day balancing provides the higher
flexibility to the shippers but may generate anti competitive behaviors.
Gas storage plays an essential role in providing additional resources
to market players (including balancing reserves) and flexibility to the
system. Depleted fields, aquifers and salt caverns allow for arbitrage
in the spot market and permit to stabilize prices between seasonal cy-
cles. At the same time, storage reserves can be used to meet short-term
demand peaks and accumulation when the demand is low. Storage ser-
vices offer a combination of capacity (space) and injection/withdrawal
rates that varies across technology and can be used for different pur-
poses. LNG terminals, for instance, allow for fast variation of gas supply
and provide the highest flexibility to operators. This implies a strategic
regulation on the new investments for essential facilities that must be
pursued in the next years. LNG industry, for example, can be defined
as a competitive business, but the return of the investment are related to
the rules governing the access to the infrastructure (Third Party Access)
which can depress the investments.
Finally, gas storage is determinant in stabilizing supply to final con-
sumers. The importation of gas from non-EU countries, indeed, includes
an additional risk, connected to the geographical routes during trans-
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portation. Europe is therefore subjects to external sources and, conse-
quently, to potential disruptions in case of political conflicts. This gen-
erates a risk on the security of supply that can concludes in period with
scarce importations of gas (for instance, during gas crises)17. In these sit-
uations member states rely more on their (strategic) storage reserves and
diversify their importation (eg. LNG importations from American coun-
tries). The attraction of new investments into the storage sector and the
launch of new sites will represent an important objective for EU regula-
tors in the coming years18.
2.5 Conclusions
Electricity and gas markets in Europe are evolving faster, pushed by the
need of creating a common market, ensure a good degree of internal
competition and providing the adequate resources for the stability of the
systems and security of supply, in a period characterized by the large
penetration of the renewable generation. The European economic crisis,
started in 2009, imposed a slowing down in the realization of important
facilities (as for instance LNG terminals and tanks) aimed at reducing the
cost of energy and provide final benefits to end-users. The trend of the
European energy demand for the period 2001-2011 is reported in Figure
7 (electricity) and 8 (natural gas) in Appendix. The data of 2011 indicates
a shrink in the electricity demand higher than 1,5% in 2011 compared to
the previous year (-2,8% compared to 2008). This reduction, however,
should not relax some of the issues discussed throughout the paper but,
on the contrary, should reinforce the increasing need for flexible tools.
In fact, in a liberalized market for electricity, power plants compete to
dispatch energy according to their economic merit order. In such an or-
der, renewables collocate usually in the first positions since they bene-
fit from an incentivized regulation and almost null marginal costs. In
other words, renewables impose a “crowding out” effect on the classical
17An example has been the gas crisis in February 2012 following the political tensions
between Ukraine and Russia.
18The investments in storage technologies expected in EU in the coming years are re-
ported in Figure 6 in Appendix
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power generation, generally consisting in thermoelectric power plants.
Whenever the classical power plants result to be turned off in the spot
market, the TSOs have to activate them before asking for the ancillary
services they can provide. This generates an additional expense for the
system, since powering up a plant is costly and its utilization is uncer-
tain. Moreover, the boost of renewable capacity may force some classic
power plants to exit the market, reducing again the reserve margins for
the TSOs.
Additionally, in periods where the energy demand is low, the prices
for electricity and gas are declining. This may disincentive shippers to
accumulate gas during the worm seasons ready to be used during the
cold period. The problems related to an unexpected disruption or a crit-
ical change in demand so are exacerbate by the lack of fuel reserves for
the thermoelectric production. This impacts also on the injection and
withdrawal rates of the main underground storage site, i.e. depleted
fields, which depends on the amount of gas in stock. When the latter is
abundant in the site, the withdrawal rate is higher and the injection is
lower. The inverse happens when the site is almost empty. In this case
the reduction of the gas stored changes the degree of flexibility of the gas
stored.
A final remark is dedicated to the leading role hoped for the demand
in the next years. The development of smart meters should allow con-
sumers to monitor the market price and permit them to modulate their
consumption in real time. Such a modulation is desirable and would per-
mit to reach higher levels of energy efficiency, indicated as a priority by
the EC, both in terms of energy consumption reduction and abatement
of the cost of energy to final consumers.
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2.6 Appendix Chapter 1
Figure 4: Evolution of coal, gas, oil and European average wholesale
power prices
Source: EC Quarterly Report on European Electricity Market - 3rd and 4th quarters
2012.
Figure 5: EU cross border monthly physical flows by region
Source: EC Quarterly Report on European Electricity Market - 3rd and 4th quarters 2012.
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Figure 6: Gas storage capacity per country 2006-2011 and new projects in
2011
Source: Natural gas storage and its regulation, Ascari (2012) - FSR SPECIALISED
TRAINING ON REGULATION OF GAS MARKETS
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Figure 7: EU-27 electricity consumption in the period 2001-2011
Source: Eurostat
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/energy/data/main_tables)
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Figure 8: EU-27 gas consumption in the period 2001-2011
Source: Eurostat
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/energy/data/main_tables)
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Chapter 3
A Proposed Design for Gas
Storage Services in Italy
3.1 Introduction
Storage services represent an essential part in the chain of natural gas
supply. Storage gives the opportunity to accumulate gas in the periods
where the demand is low (summers) in anticipation of high consumption
periods (winters). This function is usually referred as seasonal modulation.
From an economic point of view1, the possibility to store gas in different
periods of the year provides shippers2 with a tool for stabilizing the prices
offered to final consumers. The demand of gas is, indeed, characterized
by a high seasonality. Figure 9 in Appendix shows the trend of the Italian
monthly consumption of natural gas during the years 2009-2011, while
Figure 10 shows that the cycle is driven principally by the domestic con-
sumption. Absent the possibility to store gas, the prices would jump
during winters and fall in summers.
The possibility of disruptions due to geopolitical risks provides a sec-
1(23) provides a review of the economic literature on the various services provided by
gas storage.
2A shipper is an operator that is responsible for the transmission of the natural gas
from a geographic point to another, through the utilization of the transmission network
(pipelines).
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ond argument for gas stockpiling. The strategic (or precautionary) storage
plays a key-role in ensuring the security of gas supply, in particular in
Europe where the dependency from non-EU countries is structural3. The
risk of facing unexpected reduction of gas importations impose to EU
countries to maintain a constant amount of gas in storage sites. Such a
need is exacerbated by the reduction of EU production4 as confirmed by
Figure 11 in Appendix, that reports the trend of production in Europe
and, separately, in Italy during the years 2002-2011.
The third task assigned to storage is that of guaranteeing a fast re-
sponse to short-term (daily or intra-daily) demand peaks and represents
the argument of this paper. In this perspective, gas storage can be seen as
an alternative to the spot market. In absence of a liquid market (as pre-
vious to the market liberalization5 that took place at the end of the last
century), gas furniture is principally guaranteed to the shippers by long-
term supply contracts6. These contracts generally provide the shippers
with a flat amount of gas, necessary to satisfy the baseload consumption,
leaving to storage services the task of covering demand peaks7. In the re-
cent years, the development of the spot market in Italy gave to the ship-
3According to the European Commission, Russia and Algeria provide almost 50% of
European Gas Consumption.
4The production of gas in Europe restrains to about 8% of world production. Nether-
lands and Norway are the biggest producers while UK, Germany and Italy are the biggest
consumers. The biggest world producer of natural gas is Russia with 17% of world pro-
duction (Source: Eurostat). In the last years a greater attention has been paid to the cost
and benefits related to the production of shale gas. For the purpose of this paper, it suffices
to mention that this type of production requires, compared to conventional natural gas ex-
traction, a deeper underground penetration – about two miles - with associated high cost
of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal completions. In USA the programs of extraction on
industrial-scale of shale gas started around 70’s; in Europe the extraction of shale gas is still
at the core of researches aimed at evaluating the costs related to environmental impact.
5The liberalization of gas markets in Europe has been driven by the directive
1998/30/CE and 2003/55/CE, adopted by the members states with internal regulations.
In Italy the Decree 164/2000 adopted the two European directives.
6Generally these long-term agreements include a Take-Or-Pay (TOP) clause. Such a
clause gives the option to the shipper to withdrawal gas up to fixed amount under the
payment of a fixed price. The price must be paid independently by the decision to take
or not the gas from the grid. Therefore, these contacts results to be “rigid” to demand
variations and impose a big cost for the shipper for varying its supply strategy.
7As it will be discussed in-depth in the next section, the ability of a storage facility to
meet short-term variations depends on the technology of the site.
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pers an additional instrument to trade gas for short-term needs8. Simi-
larly, intra-day variations of delivery and consumption programs implies
the need of balancing real time injections and withdrawals and avoid
congestions on the grid. In the European systems, balancing services are
provided by independent TSOs (Transmission System Operators), un-
bundled with the production activity9. While the discussion on the or-
ganization of the balancing services is further the scope of this paper,
it suffices to mention that in Italy, according to the current regulation10,
physical unbalances - the difference between injections and withdrawals
programs - on the grid are corrected by using the gas present in storage
sites.
The regulatory debate related to the utilization of gas storage for
short-term modulation is centered, essentially, on two issues. The first is
the attraction of investments in the infrastructures that increase the quick
“responsiveness” (or flexibility) of the system. The second argument is
related, instead, to the optimal allocation of these resources among the
operators and how this influences the stability of the system. The Italian
market is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, given the strong
dependence from thermoelectric production (see Figure 12 in Appendix),
Italy represents the third consumer of natural gas in Europe. This gener-
ates a larger exposition of the country to the risk of supply shocks, both
in the long and, importantly for this analysis, in the short term. Second,
the strong increase of renewable sources in the electricity industry (Photo-
8The Italian over-the-counter (OTC) spot market for gas takes place at the virtual hub
PSV (Punto di Scambio Virtuale), while the regulated market has been introduced in 2010 and
is run by IPEX (Italian Power Exchange). An important innovation has been the launch
of the balancing market (PB-Gas) in 2011 that permits to correct shippers unbalances on
daily basis. In Europe, the most liquid markets are in UK (NBP) and in North-Europe (e.g.
Zeebrugge and TTF Hubs).
9The need of a legal unbundling originated by the recognition that de facto monopolies
for the production and distribution of natural gas were operating in most EU countries.
In order to guarantee a non-discriminatory access to the transportation networks, EU di-
rectives 1998/30/CE and 2003/55/CE asked for the creation of independent transmission
system operators (TSO). In Italy, the Decree (DL) 93/2011 assigned the balancing and dis-
patching activities to SNAM RETE GAS Spa.
10According to the Regulation ARG/gas 45/11 of the AEEG (AutoritÃ per l’energia
elettrica ed il gas), the TSO acquires the resources for balancing the grid in real time relying
on the total storage capacity available into the system.
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voltaic and Wind Turbines above all) occurring in the recent years (see
Figure 13 in Appendix) is exacerbating the need of flexible storage ser-
vices to cover demand peaks. Suppose, in fact, that in the real time an
unexpected collapse of the renewable generation needs to be compen-
sated by an instantaneous increase of the production from CCGT (com-
bined cycle gas turbine), leading than to an increase of the gas demand.
To manage this situation, the gas TSO relies on the reserves available into
the system: the flexibility asked to the electricity industry than transfers
directly to the gas market during the balancing phase.
Whereas the precautionary accumulation has been recognized as
the most important purpose in the Italian and EU political debates for
decades, the increasing importance of flexibility as the main character-
istic of storage reserves is a quite new subject. This poses the issues of
which services can be labeled as “flexible” and what should be their op-
timal regulation, in terms of incentives for the realization of the relevant
facilities and allocation of the capacity. As it will be highlighted in the
next section, the resources that are available to shippers are limited and
their access represents a key element for promoting market competition
and efficiency11. Although a market based approach for the allocation of
these resources is desirable, this must occur coherently with the provi-
sion of reserves to the TSO for the balancing operations.
The paper is organized as follow: section 2 attempts to define flexibil-
ity services in terms of the performances associated to different storage
technologies; section 3 describes the current Italian regulation for the re-
alization of new facilities and their access to market operators; section 4
includes the regulatory proposals and section 5 concludes the analysis.
3.2 Flexibility Services and Storage Technolo-
gies
Generally, with the term “flexibility” it is usual to indicate all the possi-
ble instruments that give to the shippers the possibility to change their
11This result has been stressed by (16) and (17).
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injection or withdrawal positions in the short-term. Despite this can be
considered an easy concept, the definition of a market for flexible ser-
vices it is not. The reason is implicit in the definition of any market: the
substitutability of the products that are included in the market must be
high. For instance, the resources adapt to the scope of seasonal modula-
tion can be less efficient (or useless) to meet daily peaks. Such an issue
has been studied for the Italian case by (12). In this paper the authors
apply a Delphi Analysis12 to conclude that “[. . . ]unsurprisingly, the most
suitable tool for both seasonal and peak flexibility is storage". This work af-
firms that storage provides higher flexibility compared to other possible
instruments as, for instance, interruptible contracts13, production or re-
sorting to the spot market. However, the technology of storage is not
uniform and sites are characterized by different sets of parameters that
determine the degree of flexibility of the services provided. These pa-
rameters include the volume of Working Gas (WG) measured in GSmc14,
injection and withdrawal rates (MSmc/day). The substitutability of stor-
age services and, accordingly, the individuation of the investments that
increase the short term modulation of the system than must be evalu-
ated according to these technical characteristics. A possible classification
of the technologies - sorted according to the ascending degree of flexibil-
ity - is proposed in sections 2.1-2.3, while section 2.4 describes the current
available capacity for the Italian market.
12The Delphi methodology has been developed in the 1950s by the RAND Corporation
and it has been applied to numerous research fields such as health care, transportation,
etc... This consists in a series of questionnaires addressed to experts and coordinated by a
facilitator. A description of the methodology is provided directly in Section 3 of (12).
13There are several forms of interruptible contracts. In general an interruptible contract
permits to reduce the load to consumers.
14The Standard Cubic Meter is the measurement unit of the volume of gas and indicates
the gas volume at the atmospheric pressure and temperature of 15° C). A GScm corre-
sponds to one billion of Smc. The Working Gas is the amount of gas that is available to the
market and can be reintegrated in the site. It divides in Cushion Gas (necessary to provide
peak performance) and (proper) Working Gas (ready to be used by market operators).
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3.2.1 Underground Sites for Seasonal Modulation (Low
Flexibility)
This category includes the usual Depleted Gas Fields, which corresponds
to production fields where natural gas has already been extracted and,
for their nature, are suitable to storage. The working capacity of this
sites can be estimated around 1.000-2.000 MScm, the withdrawal (or
send-out) rate between 20-50 MScm/day and the injection rate around
10 Mscm/day15. Depleted Gas fields have a large working capacity but a
relatively low rate of injection and it takes about 3 to 6 months in order to
fill the storage to its maximum WG. It is important to notice that the send-
out capacity of this storage site reduces16 as the stored volume reduces
limiting, thus, the ability of the field to cover extended demand peaks.
The investment cost of a depleted fields could be estimated around 700
M/Â€ and the lead-time of investment is from 5 to 8 years17. The char-
acteristics of a depleted field makes this storage site an adequate tool for
seasonal modulation purposes.
An alternative to depleted gas fields are the Aquifers. An Aquifer is
an underground layer of water-bearing permeable rock, where the gas is
injected and a natural gas shift reaction occurs. The technical parameters
characterizing an acquifer are similar to those of a depleted field, but
the costs associated to this technology and the lead-time of investment
are higher. Indeed, it can be estimated an investment cost of around 800
M/Â€ and 10-12 years to make the site working18. The reason for this is
that, contrarily to a depleted field, the geological features of the acquifer
reservoir are not known at the time the reservoir is discovered and large
investment must be done in investigation of field’s characteristics. More-
over this kind of site requires a large amount of cushion gas, with higher
associated costs, since no natural gas is already present in the field. This
makes this kind of reservoir the more costly facility to store gas.
15Sources: Italian Ministry of Economic Development, Stogit S.p.a. (www.stogit.it).
16The reduction of the volume implies a reduction of the pressure of gas stored.
17Source: (24).
18See supra note 47.
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3.2.2 Underground Sites for Short-Term Peaks (Medium
Flexibility)
This category includes the Salt Caverns. Through the process of solution
mining the salt is dissolved by pumping the water in the cavern. This
process leaves void and continues until the cavern is the desired size.
The working capacity of the site is low compared to previous sites but
generates high deliverability and lower investment costs. The send-out
capacity can be determined between 2-4 MScm/day against a working
capacity around 30-70 MScm. The costs reduce to around 40 M/Â€19
and the investment lasts 1-5 years. Given its relatively high send-out
rate, this type of facility is generally used to satisfy peaks in demand.
This is confirmed by the fact that, in order to fill in the reservoir, it takes
around 20-40 days, a time sensibly lower compared to the 200-250 days
necessary to fill in depleted fields and aquifers.
3.2.3 Other Storage Techniques (High Flexibility)
This category includes LNG Storage and Line-packing. The storage of nat-
ural gas can be realized through artificial infrastructure containing LNG
(liquefied natural gas) and reintroduced into the market through a re-
gasification terminal. Through the process of liquefaction, natural gas
can be easier stored on-shore (LNG Storage Tank) and marine trans-
ported (LNG carriers)20. The advantages of this technology are clear.
First, LNG carriers by maritime transportation permit long distance im-
portation and a positioning close to the market, assuring the highest flex-
ibility to the system. Second, liquefied gas occupies a lower space than
underground storage (around 600 times less space). Finally, LNG reser-
voir do not need cushion gas to work and consequently the efficiency of
the artificial site is increased21. For their nature, LNG reservoirs adapt
19The source is (24). (27) estimates different costs for the realization of the facilities.
20Natural gas is liquefied and conserved approximately at a temperature of -163 °C. The
reservoirs connect the LNG tanks to a regasification terminal (on-shore or off-shore) which
brings LNG back to its gaseous state before delivering it to the pipeline.
21In other words, all the capacity that can be stored represents the working capacity of
the site.
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perfectly to deliver the absolute peak demand for a small number of
hours or days a year. The disadvantage are related to the higher cost
of investment and maintenance.
Line-packing indicates the possibility of temporarily store gas di-
rectly into the pipeline through an increase of the internal pressure. This
possibility is exploited for short term variations where, generally, accu-
mulation occurs in off-peak periods for next days’ peaking demand. In
the current design of the Italian market, this resource is used for balanc-
ing purpose by the TSO.
Whereas LNG storage industry can be analyzed independently from
gas transmission, line-packing depends directly on the development of
the grid. The latter is further the scope of this paper and the attention
will be concentrated mainly on LNG and the other storage facilities. A
summary of the different technology characteristics is provided in Table
2 in Appendix.
3.2.4 The Italian Gas Storage System
At the end of 2012 the total storage capacity in Italy was 16.430 MScm22,
offered by 10 working sites, all of them corresponding to depleted gas
fields. One new concession has been granted by the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Development (hereafter: MED) and for seven new sites the ad-
ministrative license release procedure started. The sites, the capacity
(base and peak) and the storage operators are indicated in Table 3 in
Appendix. In order to receive the license for storing gas in an under-
ground site a complex administrative procedure must be passed. This
involves a detailed analysis, spanning from the characteristics of the op-
erators to the environmental impact analysis and implies a stream of in-
formative obligation from the applicants towards the local government
and the Ministry. This procedure plays a key role in the timing of the
investment. In particular, the excessive delay from the presentation of
the project and the license release has been accused of depressing entry
22Source: MED, available on http://unmig.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/unmig/stoccaggio/info/cosa.asp
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into the sector23. What concerns to this work is not the administrative
procedure per se but, instead, the regulation on who is entitled to present
a project for a license and what happens when more operators are inter-
ested to the same storage site. These arguments will be discussed more
in detail in the next section.
LNG terminals are subject to an administrative authorization by the
MED and the Ministry of Environment and, as for underground sites, the
license release is the result of a joint work of national and regional admin-
istrations. Currently in Italy there are 3 working LNG terminals: one On-
shore (Panigaglia- SP) with a re-gasification capacity of 3,4 GSmc/year
and two off-shore with a capacity of 8 GSmc/year (Porto Tolle – RO) and
3,75 GSmc/year (Livorno)24. Additional projects have been presented
and are currently under administrative scrutiny.
3.3 The Current Regulation of Storage Facilities
and Capacity Allocation.
This section is intended to introduce the current regulation of storage
services in Italy. In particular the next paragraphs focused on the key
points and criticalities related to the procedure for the release of a storage
license, the remuneration for the realization of the infrastructures, the
access to storage services and the rules for the allocation of the capacity.
23In some cases, this has been more than one year. In particular, longer delay are at-
tributed to the interventions of local governments on the occasion of the evaluation of the
project’s environmental impact. For a detailed description of the procedure the reader can
see (3).
24LNG terminal can be on-shore or off-shore. On shore technology consists in storage
tanks located, generally, close to a harbor and connected to a terminal carrier. Off-Shore
technologies can be Gravity Based Structure (GBS) or Floating Storage Regassification Unit
(FSRU). In the first case the terminal is submerged with a stabilizing mass on the bottom of
the sea, while in the second case the terminal is anchored permanently to the seabed. Re-
cently, a new technology, the Offshore Regasification Gateway, permits to combine the trans-
portation and regasification process on the same carrier, increasing so the flexibility of the
LNG (see Figure 14 in Appendix).
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3.3.1 The procedure for the Storage License
Prior to the Legislative Decree (LD)164/00 the right to use storage sites
were exclusively assigned to the state monopolist company ENI Spa. The
LD 164/00 liberalized the entire gas sector but opted for an administra-
tive concession for the utilization of storage sites (underground on-shore
and off-shore). The concession is grant by the MED for a period of 20
years, and is eventually renewed for two periods of 10 years each, for a
total duration at most of 40 years25. LD 164/00 defined also the way the
concession must be granted. In particular, who is entitled of a concession
for the production of gas may successively ask the conversion of the field
in a storage site. In this case the concession is granted automatically -
that is without a competition - by the MED.
Informative obligations are instead imposed on the owners of a gas
field with an initial reserve of 0.5 GSmc and with 80% of the gas already
extracted. These have to communicate to the MED the characteristics
of the field and provide information about the adequacy of the site for
storage purposes. After the receipt of all the information from the pro-
ducers, the MED indicates which fields are feasible for storing gas and
accept requests for the concession of storage. The MED evaluates each
project according to a set of indicators varying from the completeness of
the project to the expected environmental and occupational impact. The
same occurs when a concession expires or for those sites where no con-
cession has been previously granted. According to the current law, there-
fore, the owners of a concession for the production of gas are dispense
from competing with potential entrants for storage sites, to the extent
that the production fields are not close to fully depletion. The selection
of a candidate is only the first step towards the beginning of the storage
operations. In fact, before the launch of a new site, the operator needs
to obtain the environmental certificates by the regional government. The
long lasting procedure has been the cause of delays in the launch of new
sites. In some cases the final authorization has been awarded one year
after the concession.
25The concessions granted before the entering into force of the Decree 164/00 are instead
preserved for their entire scheduled period.
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Regarding LNG terminals, the authorization procedure for their con-
struction is more complex. Indeed, according to the location of the ter-
minal and whether there is the presence or not of the national strategic
interest, the license is granted by the MED together with the Ministry
of Environment or, alternatively, by the local government. Moreover,
the authorizations may require the achievement of environmental certifi-
cates and/or other obligations. So far, all the procedures for the release
of new licenses included an environmental impact analysis.
3.3.2 The Remuneration of the Investments
According to the DL 93/11, the MED indicates the minimal requirements
that any facility (LNG terminals, underground storage sites, interconnec-
tors etc. . . ) must have to be considered essential for the development of
the internal (and EU) market and the security of supply. This character-
istic gives the right to the investors to receive the incentives defined by
the national Authority (AutoritÃ per l’energia elettrica e il gas – AEEG) and
be remunerated for the realization of new infrastructures. With regard
to underground storage sites, the Authority individuated three different
types of investments: (i) with no impact on the total amount of capac-
ity (no incentive is recognized); (ii) finalized to increase the total storage
capacity and (iii) for the realization of new sites or peak-shaving facilities
(highest level of remuneration). Referring to LNG infrastructures, two
types of investments are instead considered: (i) for the maintenance of
existing infrastructures (no additional incentives are recognized); (ii) for
increasing the regasification capacity or the construction of new termi-
nals (subject to higher remuneration).
3.3.3 The Third Party Access to Storage (TPA)
The European Directive 98/30/CE26 and the DL 164/00 introduced the
obligation for storage operators to provide services to the shippers on
non-discriminatory basis, under a Third Party Access (TPA) regime. Nev-
ertheless, the directive did not impose a specific guide to legislators
26This directive has successively been substituted by the directive 2003/55/CE.
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on the implementation of the TPA, but let national jurisdictions free to
choose among a negotiated or regulated TPA. The Italian legislator opted
for a fully regulated TPA, entitling the national regulator to decree on
the services that can be supplied and the constraints that storage oper-
ators have to fulfill. Importantly, the authority is also empowered to
determine and regularly update the tariffs for the access to gas storage
facilities27. The Directive 2003/55/CE included also the possibility for
storage operators to ask for an exemption from TPA. This opportunity
may occur in presence of some conditions. In particular, TPA exemp-
tions can be awarded if (i) the investment is considered pro-competitive
and improves the security of supply; (ii) the risks associated with the
investments are so high that without TPA exemption the project would
not be made; (iii) at least a legal unbundling between the infrastructure
and a final user must hold; (iv) the exemption is not detrimental for the
competition and internal-market efficiency. According to the Italian law
239/04 the exemption is granted on a case-by-case basis at least for 20
years and (at least for) 80% of the new capacity.
Like underground storage, LNG terminals have the same TPA impo-
sition. It is important to mention that TPA can be denied only for two
reasons: (i) absence of residual capacity that can be offered by the facility
and (ii) objective difficulty for a shipper to operate in the market, due to
the take-or-pay contracts that have been signed before the introduction
of the directive 98/30/CE. From a theoretical point of view, the challenge
for the regulator is the right quantification of the incentives in order to
promote new investments (assuring a “normal” return to the investors)
without creating distortions in the market. This trade-off has been tack-
led by the Authority with a capital remuneration linked to the type of the
investment (increasing peak capacity, increasing the “uniform” capacity
or new investments) and with the introduction of a uniform set of tariffs.
On the other hand, new shareholders may consider the remuneration
of the capital not sufficient to bear the initial costs. In these cases the
investment can be undertaken only if a TPA exemption is granted. Con-
27For example, Table 4 in Appendix reports the tariffs applying in 2014 for different
storage services
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sequently, the adoption of tariffs that are not cost-reflective and/or the
regulatory uncertainty about the TPA exemption may discourage entry.
3.3.4 The Allocation of Storage Capacity
The AEEG defines the capacities under TPA regime and the services that
storage operators must offer to the market. AEEG defines also the or-
der or priorities for the allocation of the capacity, currently given by: (i)
Strategic Storage Capacity, (ii) Balancing Service Capacity, (iii) Mineral
Capacity and (iv) Peak (ex-Modulation) and Uniform Capacity.
The stockpiling of Strategic Gas is under the responsibility of shippers
that import gas from non-EU countries. The MED imposed to these ship-
pers to store a capacity equals to 10% of the amount of gas imported from
non-EU countries and oblige storage operators to make available enough
space for strategic reserves. The intention of the legislation is to guaran-
tee enough capacity in cases of gas crisis and disruption of furniture28.
The amount of space for this service may be redefined by the MED29.
The Balancing Service Capacity is used by the TSO in order to maintain
the equilibrium of total injection and withdrawal flows. The storage op-
erators allocate this capacity on-request to the shippers, while the phys-
ical balancing of the grid is managed by the TSO through both off-line
(underground storage) and on-line (line-pack) reserves.
The Mineral Capacity has been introduced by DL 164/00 and is for-
mally defined as the storage capacity needed to “assure to the national pro-
duction the same flexibility of importation contracts". The rationality for the
institution of this service is that, contrarily to other European countries
(for instance UK and Netherlands) where national production represents
an instrument also for the short-term modulation, the production is Italy
(for reasons related to the technical characteristics of production field)
results to be very rigid. The total amount of mineral storage capacity is
28An important example of gas crises occurred in 2009, following the decision of Russia
to reduce the amount of gas towards Ukraine, on the route towards Europe.
29For the thermal year 2013-2014 the Strategic Reserves reduced from around 5.2 to
4.6 GSmc. The potential beneficial effects of a reduction of strategic reserves in the Italian
market have been studied by (26). According to this analysis, the costs of the strategic stock
are around 16% of the value of storage market.
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decided by the MED, while injection and withdrawal rates are computed
in such a way to take into account potential production disruptions30.
The Uniform and Peak capacities are the amount of underground stor-
age left to the shippers to cover baseload demand and daily and seasonal
fluctuations. These services, introduced in 201331, represent an impor-
tant innovation with respect to the previous regulation. In particular, the
distinction between Uniform and Peak capacity, not included in the pre-
vious norms, permit to storage operators to offer two different products
to the shippers. The uniform capacity provides the shipper with a con-
stant withdrawal profile during all the year32, while the peak capacity
(indicated in the previous regulation as the modulation capacity) is as-
sociated with a dynamic performance as a function of the emptying33.
For his nature, this last service is used by the shippers to cover daily
and seasonal peaks. Most importantly, with regard to the allocation of
the capacity, the decree of 2013 introduced a combination of pro-quota
and auction mechanisms. Specifically, the entire uniform capacity is allo-
cated through a pay-as-bid auction, while part of the peak capacity is
allocated through a marginal price auction. The remaining peak capac-
ity is allocated with a pro-quota mechanism34 with a priority of access
to the shippers that directly or indirectly have in their portfolio domes-
tic final consumers35. The total amount of capacity offered for uniform
and peak services is residual to the capacity served for strategic, balanc-
ing and mineral purposes. In the case a shipper does not respect the
obligation for the utilization of the capacity to the purpose it refers (for
instance a selling of strategic storage) than a penalty - indicated by the
AEEG - is imposed on him. The scope of the regulation is discouraging
the arbitrary utilization of storage that may reveal to be harmful for the
30It must be noted that the greatest part of national production is made by ENI Spa,
which corresponds to the main user of this type of capacity.
31These services have been introduced by the DL 15/02/2013.
32The storage “thermal year" is defined as the period from the 1st April to 31st March.
33In particular, the withdrawal rate is decreasing with respect to the emptying of the gas
in stock.
34The capacity subjects to the pro-quota allocation is determined by the MED.
35Final consumers are identified with those users with a consumption lower than
200.000 Scm per year.
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system. With regard to the LNG storage capacity, the allocation is de-
fined by the MED and particular attention is paid to the LNG importers
for industrial uses. As an example, for the thermal year 2013-2014 the
storage space available and differentiated per service is reported in Table
5 in Appendix.
The introduction of a market based mechanism (auctions) for the al-
location of the flexible storage capacity represents an important step to
promote competition among shippers and is expected to extrapolate the
real willingness to pay for the utilization of the resources, provided that
the auction is well designed and cannot be manipulated by the partici-
pants. At the same time, the market approach may enter in conflict with
the security of supply to end-users if shippers are not able to make accu-
rate predictions on the demand and, consequently, on market prices. In
these cases the market allocation can differ from the “social optimal” al-
location, requiring the need of a regulatory intervention to align shippers
incentives and social benefits.
3.4 The Proposed Design
The previous sections highlighted the criticalities of the current Italian
gas market. These can be summarized in the following points:
1. The Italian market structure is characterized by an important net-
work of storage infrastructures but with few peak-shaving facili-
ties36;
2. The slowness of the bureaucratic machine and the uncertainty
about the regulatory regime related to the TPA may reduce entry-
attractiveness;
3. III. The allocation of the Peak and Uniform services may under-
mine the stability of the system if market prices are highly volatile
and shippers are not able to make accurate predictions: in this case
36It is worth to mention that the document of the MED of 8th march 2013, indicating
the National Energy Strategy (SEN), quantified in at least 8 MSmc/year the additional LNG
capacity required for the development of the internal (and EU) gas market.
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the accumulation of gas reserves may be lower than the social op-
timum.
The scarcity of peak capacity imposes a limit on the amount of gas that
is available on the grid for daily (or hourly) modulation. In presence of
a shock on the demand side, such a limit may generate situations char-
acterized by shortage of gas for consumers (gas crises). In these cases,
the balancing of the grid made by the TSO is complex and alternative
solutions must be found for reducing demand. Moreover, the technical
difficulties related to gas supply interruptions for domestic consumption
impose an additional constraint to the TSO. This problem is aggravated
by the massive penetration of renewables in the electricity generation
and the absence of abounding electricity storage capacity.
The uncertainties related to the thermoelectric production reduces the
ability of shippers to predict demand, with unclear effects on the ac-
cumulation of reserves. For instance, shippers may consider the price
spread between peak and off peak hours too low or, alternatively, un-
dervalue the number of peak hours, with the effect of discouraging the
accumulation of reserves. It must be noted that a peak scarcity event, re-
sulting from an intermittent renewable generation, does not follow nec-
essarily seasonal modulation and peaks. In other words, short periods
with high demand may occur beside classical seasonal variations. This
in turn reduces the margins available to the TSO for balancing operations
and increases price volatility not only during the winter season, but also
during the rest of the year. The analysis developed so far indicates a
room for a regulatory intervention aimed at increasing the peak-capacity
available to the shippers and encouraging the accumulation of reserves
to the optimal social level. In particular, with regard to the first issue,
section 4.1 individuates the public direct intervention as a solution to the
capacity scarcity. Section 4.2, instead, proposes the introduction of a com-
plementary market-based mechanism to improve the design on capacity
allocation.
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3.4.1 Direct Public Intervention for the Realization of the
New Infrastructure(s).
The current configuration of storage services in Italy is, as section 2
showed, based on depleted fields, while no aquifers or salt caverns are
currently operating, not even projects have been presented for their in-
stallation. This aspect denotes the lack of suitable fields or the non prof-
itability of the projects for the realization of these kind of facilities. The
absence of salt caverns, in particular, limits the capacity available to the
system for daily and, partially, intra-daily modulation. LNG infrastruc-
tures (terminals and reservoir), on the other hand, fit well to these pur-
poses and permit to “catch up” the short-term volatility of gas demand.
The main obstacles for their realization are deeply related to the regula-
tory uncertainty governing the remuneration of the investment and the
access to the facility. In the same vein, a change of the market conditions
after the approval of the project may lead the investors to abandon the
construction and this is more likely the more the license release proce-
dure extends over time.
The disincentives to invest related to the just mentioned issues have
been studied by several authors37. In particular, the regulatory uncer-
tainty about the exemption from TPA (the “regulatory holiday”) fall into
the classical hold-up problem. In fact, gas storage facilities are capital in-
tensive and have very limited alternatives once the investment is done
but, at the same time, the returns of the investments protracts over long
time, exposing investors to a large regulatory risk.
Another source of uncertainty for investor is described by the miss-
ing market argument, that defines the scarcity of price signals as a major
market failure for the attraction of new investments. The impossibility
to recover the willingness to pay of consumers in the events of scarcity
of gas furniture does not provide the right incentives to the operators to
bring new investments into the sector. Practically this happens because
the interruption of gas furniture to domestic consumers is technical com-
plex and alternative solutions to limit consumption are adopted.
37For instance, a reader can refer to (24; 25).
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To deal with these issues (hold up and missing market) the economic
literature generally proposes several solutions: long-terms contracts, ver-
tical integration and natural monopoly regulation. Long-term contracts
represent a way to spread the risk associated with the investment among
more players. Given the high cost of the investment, it is unlikely that an
operator alone is willing to bear the total cost and be subject to the vari-
ability of demand modulation. In these situations, a third party can con-
struct the necessary infrastructure and, subsequently, subcontracting ca-
pacity to the shippers. Therefore, the risk is not mitigated but is spread-
out among more players through long term agreements. These contracts,
however, suffer from two main limitations. First, they usually do not in-
clude flexibility clause (or they do at very high costs). Second, a system
based on long-term contracts reduce spot competition. In other words,
the reduction of the risk for the investors may occur at the expense of
spot market efficiency.
A vertical integrated firm which is the owner of the infrastructure and,
at the same time, is the shipper in the retail market would be interested
in making large investments if the access to the infrastructure can be de-
nied to competitors. That is, the bundling of the storage site within the
retailer provides the right incentive for entry the market and invest in
LNG facilities. Practically, this solution coincides with the abolition of
TPA clause, which instead laid its foundation on characteristics of the fa-
cility: high investment cost and limited number of feasible projects. The
conclusion is that the only market structure compatible with the verti-
cal integration is the oligopoly. These arguments led the regulator in the
EU to the assessment that an infrastructure indicated as essential facility
should be regulated with a non-discriminatory TPA.
A public regulated monopoly may well combine the incentive to invest
and guarantee a non discriminatory access to the infrastructure under a
TPA regulation. A regulated Storage System Operator (SSO) can bear the
cost for LNG investments in terminals and tanks. The introduction of
a System Operator, already adopted in the transmission sector, can turn
out to be extremely important to expand market flexibility when there is
a relevant uncertainty about market prices (missing money arguments,
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high price volatility, etc. . . ). The reasoning is similar to the introduction
of capacity markets for sustaining investments in the electricity sector.
The difference with respect to a market approach is that LNG infrastruc-
tures can be labeled as essential facilities and therefore be limited in their
remuneration by a TPA. This last observation justifies the public direct
intervention for the realization of new projects. The investments made
by the SSO would be “automatically” recognized as essential, leaving to
the Authority the definition of the optimal tariffs for their remuneration.
The latter should be based on a mechanism aimed at rewarding the pro-
gresses in the realization of the infrastructures and penalize delays. The
SSO remuneration is than spread among all the actors that receive advan-
tages from the realization of the infrastructure: final consumers, that are
hedged from the risks of disruptions during the peaks, and the shippers,
that can use storage to arbitrate on the spot market. The higher cost for
the system will be distributed over a determined number of years and re-
versed on consumers bills and shippers, according to the volume of gas
injected and withdrawn or through a fixed contribution. In particular,
the competitive allocation of storage capacity is expected to contribute to
the cost recovery.
The concentration of the activities in the hand of a single subject re-
duces the problem related to the coordination of the investments among
more players, which can lead to a “precautionary” total capital expen-
diture below the optimal social level. Finally, the SSO can be thought
to operate for a limited period of time, necessary to make the relevant
investments, after which its assets can be allocated to the market.
3.4.2 Improving the Capacity Allocation: Supply Options
for Balancing Security.
Auctions represents a powerful tool to detect the willingness to pay of
the buyers (or sellers) when there is scarcity of a good or service, pro-
vided that the auction is well designed and cannot be manipulated by
the subject involved. Auction mechanisms have been applied for the al-
location of the peak and uniform capacity described in Section 3.4. The
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theory in support of the use of auctions for the allocation of gas storage
capacity has been provided by (16; 17). The main idea is that auctions
improve social welfare whenever the final allocation is output maximiz-
ing. In particular, the paper indicates the conditions under which an ad-
ministrative allocation must be preferred to an auction mechanism and
viceversa, in a market characterized by a dominant firm and a fringe of
competitors. The strategy of introducing imperfect competition has the
intent of capture some of the real features of the current European gas
markets, where big players are at stake and new entrants are appear-
ing38.
If the advantages deriving from the adoption of market mechanism
for the allocation of the capacity are clear, the drawbacks linked to the
security and stability of the system have not been widely discussed. In
fact, it can occur that shippers are not able to predict price peaks due to
the excessive volatility of consumption and accumulate an amount of gas
lower than the social optimal level. Whenever this happens, the market
design approach enters in conflict with the target of assuring the secu-
rity of supply to end users. An example can be represented by a low
seasonal price differential expected by the shippers. This may reduce
the attractiveness of gas stockpiling, with the risk of generating scarcity
for limited periods in time, causing prices to jump up. Again, the price
peaks may reflect not necessary the lack of an adequate amount of gas for
seasonal modulation but, rather, the lack of flexible resources for daily or
intra-daily instantaneous variations. The risks of extreme revenues fluc-
tuations may than generate instability on the spot market and constrict
TSOs to adopt emergency operations. As such concern is expected to be-
come more serious due to renewable penetration and the relegation of
CCGT to a “back-up” role, the spot market design should be accompa-
nied with additional instruments.
38The work leaves an open discussion regarding the interaction between the allocation
and productive efficiency of the shippers and the effect of introducing a secondary markets
where renegotiation of storage capacities can occur. If renegotiation is allowed than it is
essential to guarantee enough liquidity to the system and avoid attempts of monopoliza-
tion and market foreclosure behaviors. This issue is more relevant the more the market is
concentrated.
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The introduction of supply option may serve to this scope. This instru-
ment would provide the TSO with the additional amount of capacity for
managing the daily modulation. This is achieved by purchasing from
the shippers an obligation to supply, on TSO request and in the real time,
the spot market with a certain amount of stored gas. This amount is
determined by the TSO as the result of the maximization of a social func-
tion that includes, among the others, the reduction of the probability of
scarcity events as a function of the total stock available39.
The shippers commit themselves40 to provide resources at a price that
cannot exceed a given cap, predetermined when the option is bought by
the TSO. The remuneration for the gas offered in the real time follows
the balancing price up to the cap. If the balancing price exceeds the lat-
ter, the shippers is required to pay back the extra-revenue he received.
Therefore, the cap acts for limiting the earnings of the shippers and con-
trolling market power in the case of scarcity of reserves for short-term
modulation.
To conclude the design, the shippers offer the options in a non dis-
criminatory way through auctions and the TSO selects the offers accord-
ing to the price ascending order. Practically, this may be conducted with
a Descending Uniform Price auction, where the TSO (or the SSO as defined
in the previous section) starts the auction calling a very high price and
keep reducing it at each step as far as the demand equalizes the offer and
a single option price (the “premium”) comes out41.
The advantages of this approach reveals to be manifold. First, the
TSO is endowed, in the fullness of time, with the additional storage ca-
pacity for the real-time balancing of the grid. Second, the price of this
additional capacity is “capped” at some determined level in the event of
scarcity, permitting to control shippers market power. Third, the market
approach gives to the shippers the possibility to diversify the risk associ-
39This mechanism can be thought as an adaptation of the capacity market from the
electricity sector to the gas industry. The elicitation of additional capacity, diversely from
electricity, is not based on the increase of gas production but, instead, on its accumulation.
40A penalty should be inflicted to the shipper who do not respect the obligation.
41The auction may include also a reservation price (lower bound) to cover part of ship-
pers fixed costs.
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ated with price volatility. Indeed, those shippers who are more risk ad-
verse towards future prices may stabilize the supply of their reserves by
receiving a premium in exchange of gas accumulation. On the other side,
the shippers who expects prices to raise up in the long term would prefer
accumulate gas when prices are lower and exploit consumption peaks.
Finally, the incentive to stabilize gas storage furniture for seasonal and
daily modulation comes at a cost for the system represented, in the mech-
anism just described, by the premium paid by the TSO for the acquisition
of the options. Accordingly, the difference between the revenues for the
selling of storage (uniform and peak) capacity and the premium is re-
versed on final users, according to consumption. The timetable of the
new market design is summarized in the Appendix.
3.5 Conclusion
This work is intended to contribute to the discussion on the optimal reg-
ulation of gas storage services. The main regulatory debates focus on
the promotion of new facilities and the definition of products aimed at
increasing system flexibility coherently with the security of supply to
end users. The institution of a public storage system operators (SSO),
responsible for the realization on new infrastructures, and the introduc-
tion of supply options propose a solution to the risk of scarcity of flexible
resources in the Italian market. These innovations are discussed into a
context of deep transformation of the energy industry. In particular, the
massive penetration of renewables increases the uncertainty related to the
modulation of storage reserves, moving the attention on the peak perfor-
mances of the system rather than its overall storage capacity. This is par-
ticularly important in Italy, where the thermoelectric production based
on CCGT satisfies the baseload consumption and generates the operat-
ing reserves for the electricity balancing operations. The establishment
of a SSO may be necessary for sharing the high costs and the risks for
the launch of new facilities. The design of a new product, complemen-
tary to the services offered with the uniform and peak capacities, reveals
to be useful for assuring adequate resources for daily (and intra-daily)
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modulation to the TSO. The higher costs for the system can be more than
compensated by a reduction of the risk of disruptions and scarcity events
in the long-term.
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3.6 Appendix Chapter 2
Figure 9: Italian National Monthly Consumption during the period 2009-
2011
Source: Italian Ministry of Economic Development
Figure 10: Sector Decomposition of Italian National Monthly Consump-
tion for the period 2009-2011
Source: Italian Ministry of Economic Development
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Figure 11: Indexes of EU-27 and Italian Gas Productions in the period
2002-2011 (Base Year: 2002)
Source: Eurostat
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Figure 12: Electricity Generation in Italy in 2012 divided by Sources
Source: AEEG – Annual Report 2012
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Figure 13: Renewable penetration in Italy (and technologies) from 2008 to
2012
Source: GSE (Statistical Reports)
Figure 14: An LNG Floating Storage and Regasification Unit
Source: Golar LNG
(http://www.golarlng.com/index.php?name=Our_Business%2FFloating_Storage_.html)
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Table 2: Typical characteristics of different natural gas storage technolo-
gies
Source: de Joode (2009) on data by (CIEP 2006)
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Table 3: Storage Sites, WG and Send-Out Capacity in Italy at the end of
2012
Source: AEEG, Annual Report 2013
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Table 4: Regulated Tariffs for Storage Services in the period from 1st Jan-
uary to 31st December 2014
Source: Stogit Spa (http://www.stogit.it/en/business_area/storage_tariffs/index.html)
Table 5: Storage capacity allocation for the thermal year 2013-2014 differ-
entiated per service.
Source: AEEG, Annual Report 2013
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The Market Design Timetable with Supply Options
Step 1: The TSO defines and make public the optimal amount of storage
reserves for all the thermal year. This is computed by the maxi-
mization of a social function that includes, among the others, the
expected level of demand and the probability of supply disruption
as a function of the overall capacity available into the system. The
regulator defines three products that have to be allocated on the
spot market: Peak Service, Uniform Service and Supply Option.
Step 2: The regulator defines the capacity to be allocated for Peak and
Uniform Services and the SSO run the auctions. At the end of
the procedure, the SSO knows the difference between the optimal
amount of storage defined in Step 1 and the total amount of gas
allocated for the Peak and Uniform services.
Step 3: In the case the difference indicated in Step 2 is positive, this be-
comes the demand of Supply Options made by the SSO. Shippers
compete to supply options in an auction mechanism that concludes
with a single equilibrium price (the premium).
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Chapter 4
Strategic Congestion in a
Day-Ahead Electricity
Market based on Zonal
Pricing
4.1 Introduction
A deregulated market for electricity gives to the buyers the opportunity
to purchase electricity from firms (generators) that charge a lower unit
price for MWh. Network capacity constraints, on the other hand, limit
the power that flow over the transmission lines and, consequently, re-
duce the amount of electricity that can be exchanged between distinct
geographic areas. Whenever such limitations arise, market internal com-
petition cannot be understood regardless of firms’ response to the incen-
tives that the network configuration may yield.
The wholesale electricity markets are designed to cope with transmis-
sion physical and contingency limits1. Exceeding the latter may cause a
power line to collapse and, in severe cases, a domino effect can produce
1A clear coverage of the functioning and the issues concerning the design of power
markets can be found in (67) and(64).
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a black-out of the entire system.
The complexity of the network is directly transferred to the market
and affects participants’ supply (or demand) strategies and the formation
of spot prices. In absence of transmission constraints, the power would
be transferred from generating units to the buyers, located anywhere on
the national territory, according to the economic merit order defined in
the day-ahead market 2.
The existence of network constraints reduces this possibility. If the
power required by some consumption units exceeds the capacity of
the connection between the consumption and the generation nodes, the
power line(s) will be congested. Following (64), all limits, both physical
and based on contingency, can always be expressed as a simple megawatt
limit on the power flow that is allowed over the line. Therefore, a line is
congested when the amount of power flowing on it reaches such limit.
To provide the right price signal to market participants, Transmission
System Operators (TSOs) design the day-ahead market in a way to re-
flect the configuration of the grid. The partition of the national market
into distinct geographic zones provides a (simplified) representation of
network constraints. In particular, regions inside each zone are character-
ized by a low frequency of congestion3. This method, generally referred
as zonal pricing, generates for any couple of zones, different prices if the
power lines connecting the two zones are congested (i.e. the network
constraints are binding). If no congestion on the grid occurs the price is,
instead, unique on the national territory and the zones do not “separate”
4.
The immediate effect is that line capacity determines the internal de-
gree of competition by connecting potentially isolated markets. Small
2The description of the economic merit order is reported in Appendix 1.
3The identifcation of zones usually relies upon historical data regarding transmission
flow and congestion patterns. Some critical issues related to the zonal partition of the na-
tional market, can be found in (9) for the Norway case, and in (8) for the Italian case. Con-
gestion management led, for instance, the Italian TSO (Terna S.p.A). to “divide” Italy into
six geographic zones (North-Central, South-Central, North, South, Sicily and Sardinia), and
six virtual zones for connections with foreign countries.
4An alternative format is the “nodal pricing” adopted, for instance, by PJM in the east
cost of USA market. In a nodal configuration, the degree of disaggregation is the highest
and the price is computed for each bus on the grid.
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improvements in the transmission capacity may than reveal highly ben-
eficial in terms of competition and reduction of the market power inside
a zone. On the contrary, a limited capacity of the cable may induce mar-
ket operators to strategic behaviors that generate a strategic congestion
of the power lines. This concept is brightly illustrated in (13):
“[. . . ] A profit maximizing firm, however, may find it quite
profitable to induce congestion into its area, thereby becoming a
monopolist on any residual demand left unserved by imports from
other regions [. . . ]”.
This article introduces a model of competition aimed at study firms’ mar-
ket strategies in a day-ahead electricity market based on zonal pricing.
The day-ahead market is run by a Power Exchange which collects, in any
hour, the aggregate demand and supply and returns equilibrium quan-
tity and price(s) determined through a uniform price auction. The model
assumes that the TSO splits the national territory into two disjoint market
zones, linked together with a limited capacity (the same both in import
and export from a zone) transmission line. Generators compete to inject
electricity by submitting a supply schedule to the power exchange, while
the total demand is assumed to be the result of a stochastic process, in-
dependent from price. The presence of transmission constraints impose,
in case of congestion, the determination of two prices, one per each zone,
given by the corresponding marginal bids of the generators.
The model originates on the approach proposed first by (65), and suc-
cessively enriched by (34) and (22), that studies the equilibrium strategies
of suppliers in a multi-unit uniform price auction without network con-
straints. The model captures some of the essential features of the compe-
tition in the day-ahead market with “short-lived” bids5. In the discrete
version of the game, generators are asked to submit a finite number of
pairs of price and quantity. This is coherent with the bidding rule set by
the power exchanges in several day-ahead market and reflects the dis-
creteness of the marginal cost function of the firms. In fact, in order to
cover daily demand, generators run first “baseload” plants that have low
5See Appendix 1.
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operating costs, and switch on more costly plants to satisfy peaks of the
demand. Nuclear power plants are classical examples of baseload units
and run constantly during the day, while plants that make use of hard
coal or oil have generally high cost and consequently form the market
peakload capacity. Despite public information about generation costs
and per period demand are far to be realistic, these are common assump-
tions in the literature and will be maintained here. Nevertheless, the
model introduced in the next sections can be generalized to allow uncer-
tainty on costs and demand side. Yet this is expected to complicate the
analysis, the incentives to play strategically should again be preserved.
The results show that, even when transmission constraints are not
binding, firms may coordinate their strategies in order to increase the
market clearing price. When this happens, a firm produces a higher
quantity in equilibrium (“price-taker”) while the other clears the mar-
ket with its marginal bid (“price-setter”). The asymmetric behaviors of
the (symmetric) firms have already been described in (22) and the model
of the next section generalizes this result, allowing for a greater variety
of parameters related to generation costs and units size. In terms of so-
cial welfare, asymmetric equilibria are inefficient since total production
costs are not minimized. Moreover, the social inefficiency increases as
the asymmetry of the equilibrium allocation increases.
The introduction of binding transmission constraints generates an ad-
ditional gaming between the firms. In particular, when the capacity of the
transmission line is very low, suppliers attempt to congest the line and
charge a higher price to the residual demand in their zone. For a firm,
this strategy is conducted by offering its marginal unit at a price higher
that of the competitor, forcing consumers located in its zone to import
electricity up to the point where the cable reaches its capacity limit. In
this situation, when the final allocation is more asymmetric than the ex-
pected equilibrium with no transmission constraints, investments aimed
at increase the capacity of the power line improve the social welfare and
reduce the market power.
The paper is organized as follow: section 2 presents a review of the
literature and the main contributions of this work; section 3 introduces
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the model and derives the equilibrium strategies of power generators;
section 4 discusses the policy implications and section 5 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature and Contributions
The interactions between network constraints and competition in the
power sector have been studied in (13). The model proposed by the au-
thors considers two competing firms located into two distinct but sym-
metric markets. Inside each market the firm faces the same (downward
sloping) demand function6. The two zones are connected each other by
a transmission line with limited capacity and firms compete on quanti-
ties (Cournot). When the transmission capacity is very small, firms act
as profit maximizing monopolists inside their zones. The introduction
of a greater connection induces the firms to adopt mixed strategies on
the support of their best response functions. The randomization varies
between what the authors define an “optimal aggressive output”, where
the quantity produced is high and the price is low with the intent to ex-
port to the contiguous area, and the “optimal passive output”, where
higher prices are charged to a residual share of the demand. Whenever
the prices differ in the two zones the line will be congested, since cus-
tomers located in the area that charges a higher price will prefer to im-
port power up to line’s capacity. When the capacity is high enough, how-
ever, a unique pure strategy equilibrium exists and it is given by the un-
constrained Cournot equilibrium. Any additional capacity improvement
has no social value, since firms would not deviate from this equilibrium.
Even though the analysis gives clear predictions on the strategies
adopted by the generators, the classic Cournot model appears to be not
particularly appropriate to describe the functioning of the day-ahead
market7. The main reason is that, in electricity markets, firms do not
commit to produce a given quantity but rather submit a more complex
6The model, as the authors argue, was a realistic representation of the market splitting
in California, where North and South correspond to two geographical interconnected areas.
7However, as the authors point out, there is “[...] no reason why the basic effect we iden-
tify here wouldn’t also obtain using other analytical approaches such as supply curve equilibria or
multiunit auctions”.
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supply function. The commitment of a firm to a supply function has
been first recognized and studied, in a generalized context, by (50). This
work introduces SFE (supply function equilibrium) for the analysis of
situations where firms compete in presence of some type of uncertainty
8. When a firm commits to a continuous supply function than it can bet-
ter adapt to market contingencies and, after the uncertainty is vanished,
it achieves its ex-post profit-maximizing outcome, a goal hardly attain-
able instead by fixing only prices or quantities. (36) applied SFE to study
competition in the British electricity market9. The authors show how
supply schedule are considerably above the marginal costs and the the-
oretical results seem confirmed by the empirical simulations proposed:
even without collusion firms can exert a strong market power.
The main criticisms of the SFE approach are related to its applicability
to real market situations. The reason is that SFE is based on the continuity
of the supply function submitted by the generators. This technical con-
dition, required to reach an equilibrium, is difficult to justify in practice.
For example, in most EU markets, power exchanges ask to participant
to submit a schedule indicating a finite number of pair price-quantity. In
other words, generators have to submit a “step supply function”10. A dif-
ferent approach, proposed first by (65), deals with this issue by modeling
competition in the power market as a multi-unit (uniform price) discrete
auction. In the original model, generators have a constant marginal cost
and face an inelastic demand. (34) and (22) generalize this model to allow
for increasing step cost function, asymmetric firms and downward slop-
ing demand function and show why asymmetric strategies may emerge
8In the work proposed by (50), the source of uncertainty were attributed to the de-
mand. The authors also show that, if no uncertainty is present into the market, there is a
multiplicity of Nash equilibria. However, as they pointed out, in the absence of uncertainty
a firm knows exactly its equilibrium residual demand and this makes the supply function
strategy not compelling, since this causes only an increase in the number of equilibria.
9Contrarily to the basic Klemperer and Meyer, no uncertainty on the demand side is
included and the number of supply function equilibria is reduced by introducing supply
constraints for the firms.
10A non technical discussion about the differences between the continuous and the dis-
crete auction format is provided in (31). An important contribution, aimed at understand-
ing under which conditions the discrete representation of supply functions can be approx-
imated by the continuous representation, has been provided by (43).
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in equilibrium.
Built on this last approach, this paper introduces transmission net-
work constraints for studying the equilibrium strategies of the firms in
an electricity market based on zonal pricing. In particular, two symmet-
ric firms are located into two distinct geographic areas connected by a
limited power line. The supplies submitted to the Power Exchange de-
termine the dispatch merit order of the generating units of the firms and
the MW amount of import/export from one zone to the other. In the
case the amount flowing on the transmission line exceeds its MW limit,
the zones separate and the prices (one per each zone) are determined by
the (intra-zonal) marginal market clearing offer. To my knowledge, this
is the first attempt to study the effects of network constraints on compe-
tition in the power sector within the multi-unit auction framework.
If on the one hand, the model is able to replicate the conclusions of
the works of (34) and (22), on the other it considers an additional vari-
able, the power line capacity, that can be exploit to derive policy sugges-
tions aimed at mitigate market power on the supply-side. Under certain
conditions, the model reconciles with the findings of (13) and indicates
a precise target for investments in transmission capacity, above which
additional development of the grid will not result in any further price re-
duction since generators have no incentives to deviate from the reached
equilibrium.
4.3 The Model
Consider two risk-neutral symmetric power generators (indexed by
i = 1, 2) located in two distinct geographic areas, Z1and Z2, connected
through a power line with a limited transmission capacity, L. Each zone
is characterized by an injection node (generation) and a withdrawal node
(consumption)11. The demand in each zone is met by the internal pro-
duction or through importation from the contiguous zone, up to the max-
imal capacity of interconnection (see Figure 15).
11Alternatively one can consider additional nodes grouped under a “hub”.
67
Figure 15: Physical Grid Representation
The following assumptions regarding production costs and market
demand will be maintained throughout the paper:
Assumption1 (Production Costs): Firms produce electricity employing a
fixed number U of generating units with start-up costs normalized to zero12. In
particular indicate with U = {1, 2, ..., u, ...U} the set representing the gener-
ating units of each firm. Each production unit ′u′ has a constant unit cost of
production indicated by cu and a maximum generating capacity indicated by
ku. The current output of a unit is instead indicated by qu with qu ≤ ku13.
Generators rank the units in the cost-ascending order, and so the set U can
be reshuffled so that U = {1, 2, ..., u, ..., U : cu ≤ cu+1}. Costs are common
knowledge in the market.
Let u(q) be the marginal unit necessary to produce the quantity q, that is
u(q) =
{
minu :
q∑
u=1
ku ≥ q
}
. The marginal cost function will so be given
by c(q) = cu(q), while the total cost function is C(s) =
u(q)∑
u=1
cuqu where
12Alternatively one may consider plants already running in the Day-Ahead Market.
13Note that this notation can also be used to represent “packages” of quantities that are
produced by the same plant. For instance, the same plant can produces from 0 to 100 MWh
at a unit (marginal) cost lower than the production in the range [100-200] MWh. The two
packages can so be treated as two different units.
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qu = ku for all u < u(q). The total capacity of a firm is given instead by
K =
U∑
u=1
ku.
Assumption 1 summarizes the discreteness of the production cost
function of a firm. The model is general enough to include cases where
a firm owns a single power plant with increasing costs associated with
higher production or, alternatively, different generation technologies (for
instance “baseload” and “peakload”)14 or a mix of both. Importantly, the
information about the costs of the firms are known to market partici-
pants. This last hypothesis can be justified by the communications about
the technical characteristics of the generating units that firms, generally,
provide to grid operators for reasons related to the security and stability
of the system during real time operations.
Assumption2. (Market Demand): The internal demands in Z1,2 are in-
dicated by D1,2 and are independent from prices. Let D1 + D2 = DT and
Prob(DT ) : [0, 2K]→ [0, 1].
Assumption 2 identifies the total demand as the result of a simple
stochastic process limited by the total generation capacity available in
the market15. As it will be clear further on, the introduction of a price-
sensitive demand does not eliminate the incentive on the bidding strate-
gies of generators but only their magnitude that, in these situations,
would vary with the elasticity of the demand. Therefore, the market
demand considered here still provides useful insights without compli-
cating the equilibrium strategy computation. For the same reason and
without loss of generality set D1 = D2 = D.
Firms compete to supply electricity in a Day-Ahead market, run by a
Power Exchange through hourly auction, subject to a zonal pricing reg-
ulation. In particular, the following business rules (BR) apply:
14In this case one can consider additional injection points corrisponding to each of the
power plant owned by a firm.
15The model does not include the possibility of scarcity events (total demand higher
than total generation capacity).
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1. For any hour of the day the generators are asked to submit a step
supply function to the Power Exchange containing, for any produc-
tion unit, a single price (Â€/MWh) at which the generators are will-
ing to sell all unit’s capacity. A strategy for the generator is given
by a step supply function βi(u) : U → P where P =
{
0, P¯
} ⊂ R
and P is an arbitrary price ceiling (maximum price accepted by the
pool). Withouth loss of generality assume that P¯ > cU 16.
2. For each hour of the day, the Power Exchange receives the mar-
ket demand in each zone and forwards them to the firms before
the beginning of the market. The Power Exchange collects the sup-
ply of the generators and gives back the equilibrium quantity of
each firm, szii , and the price, pi, in each zone. Formally indicate
the function Outcome as O(β1(u), β2(u), Dt) : [0, P ]2U × [0, 2K] →
[0,K]2 × [0,K]2 × [0, P¯ ]2.
3. The pricing rule adopted by the Power Exchange is the Zonal Trans-
mission Marginal Pricing. This works as follow: in any hourly auc-
tion, the price in each zone is determined by the clearing condition
D = sZi1 (β1(u), β2(u)) + s
Zi
2 (β1(u), β2(u)) and with s
Z1
1 + s
Z2
1 = s1,
trough a Uniform Price Auction (or System Marginal Pricing - SMP)
mechanism. In particular, in each zone, the price submitted for the
marginal generating unit17 determines the zonal price. Each firm,
independently by the zone where the quantity is consumed, will be
paid the price of the zone where it injects electricity. All consumers,
instead, are charged the same amount, given by a weighted aver-
age of the prices with the consumption in the two zones18.
4. Whenever the line is not congested, that is the import/export of elec-
tricity from one area to the other is lower than L, there is a unique
market (zone) and a unique clearing price. Formally the equilibrium
price in the single market zone is given by pNC = maxiβ (u (si))
16The Price Ceiling is higher than the highest unit marginal cost of the firms.
17The last generating unit necessary to satisfy the zonal demand.
18Under the assumption D1 = D2, this reduces to a simple average of zonal prices.
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and call i the price-setter and j the price-taker19.
5. The following acceptance and priority rules are adopted by the Power
Exchange: (a) The market supply in each zone is constructed by
ordering the generators’ bids in the price-ascending order (the so
called merit order); (b) Whenever some units are priced the same,
that the lower cost unit is dispatched first; (c) In the case the
firms submit the same unit at the same price and this results to be
marginal (i.e. the price-setting unit), than the total quantity required
for this unit will be equally splitted among the two firms.
The timing of the game is summarized in Figure 16
Figure 16: Timing of the game
The objective of firm ”i” located in zone Zi is to maximize its hourly
profit function, given by Πi = pZii si(β1(u), β2(u))−C(si). The following
analysis will focus solely on increasing supply functions20, that is β(u) ≤
β(u + 1). From the clearing condition in BR3 it is useful to derive the
residual demand of player ′i′ in the zone Zi given by:
Definition1 The demand supplied by player ”i” in zone Zi is indicated by
sZii (βi(u), βj(u)) = D − sZij (βi(u), βj(u))
Note that when DT = 2K the demand is covered by the total gener-
ation capacity and the only possible equilibrium allocation is given by
19If pNC = max1β (u (s1)) = max2β (u (s2))both players are at the same time the
price taker and price setter
20This comes at the cost of reducing the number of equilibria available to the firms.
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O(β1(u), β2(u), Dt) =
{
(D, 0); (D, 0); (P , P )
}
where the total demand is
equally splitted between the two firms and the price (or prices in case
of congestion) reaches the ceiling. This result is trivial since generators
are monopolist on half of market demand. Independently by the level of
the demand, such an equilibrium holds also in the case where L = 0. In
this situation the possibility to import/export is inhibited (consider for
instance a power line maintenance) and firms are monopolist inside their
injection zone.
The next section is intended to derive the equilibrium solution for the
basic case where the transmission constraint is not binding. This hap-
pens when L ≥ D since, in this situation, a firm is able to export all its
capacity to cover the demand in the contiguous zone without congesting
the power line. The result generalizes the “withholding” effect already
described in Crawford et al. (2007), allowing for a higher choice of pa-
rameters related to costs, demand and units size.
Successively the analysis is enriched to study the case where L is lim-
ited and bounded by D, that is 0 < L < D. In these situations the export
capacity of a firm in a zone is constrained by the capacity of the trans-
mission line and each firm conserve in its area an irreducible residual de-
mand. As in Boreinstein et al. (2000) this generates for a firm a trade-off
between asking higher prices with the possibility of a congestion event
and offering lower prices with the intent of increasing exportations. The
result is that the marginal production unit of each firm will be offered
at a price resulting from a randomized rather than a pure equilibrium
strategy.
Equilibrium Analysis when L ≥ D.
The absence of congestion on the power line allows the delivery of any
positive amount of electricity from one area to the other. This implies
the existence of a single market zone with demand given by DT and a
unique price, here indicated by PNC . The following propositions rules
out the possibility that a firm prices some units below the marginal cost:
Proposition1 Play some units below the unit cost is a weakly dominated
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strategy.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Playing some units below the marginal cost has a double negative effect
for a firm since (i) it pushes the equilibrium price (and revenues) down-
ward and (ii) with some positive probability the firm will bear losses
at the margin. This result permits to focus the attention on those bid-
ding strategies where the units are priced at least at their marginal cost.
Next proposition reveals, instead, that the pricing strategy that asks to
the price-taker to bid all its units at the marginal cost (marginal cost pric-
ing) represents for him an optimal bidding behavior (or a ’best response’
strategy).
Proposition2 For a Price-Taker any strategy which is “outcome-equivalent”
to the marginal cost pricing is a best response strategy.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
The basic idea behind Proposition 2 is that the price-taker has an in-
centive to introduce more infra-marginal capacity by cutting its rival’s
price. This is achieved by pricing each unit at the marginal cost (or with
an outcome equivalent strategy). From Proposition 2 the next corollary
follows:
Corollary1 The minimum amount of power that is produced by the price taker
is given by D.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Propositions 2 can now be used to derive the maximization problem for
the price-setter. Indicating with i = 2 the price taker and with β∗(u) its
best response strategy and remembering that for a price setter it must
hold that β (u(s)) = pNC the objective function of player 1 becomes21:
21Notice that whenever the maximization problem admits as solution an allocation such
that pNC = max1β (u (s1)) = max2β∗ (u (s2))both players are, at the same time, the
price taker and the price setter
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max
β1(u)
Π1 (β1(u(s1)), s1(β1(u), β
∗
2(u)) =
β1(u(s1))s1 (β1(u), β
∗
2(u))− C (s1(β1(u), β∗2(u)) (PSP )
s.t. β1(u(s1)) ≤ P
The trade-off of the price setter can be explained as the choice be-
tween pricing, symmetrically with its competitor, all its units at the
marginal cost (see proposition 2) or reducing its residual demand with
the intent of increasing the equilibrium price. In this last case the price
setter will be unique and, despite of the symmetry of the firms, asym-
metric strategies will emerge. It must be noted that, given the optimal
response of player 2, there exists a continuum of strategies for player 1
that gives back the same final price pNC (outcome equivalent strategies)
and allocation and among which player 1 is indifferent. Therefore, indi-
cating with B˙(pNC , β∗2(u), DT ) the set of strategies that return the same
final price pNC , given the best response of the competitor and the total
demand DT , there exists a map M :
[
0, P
] → B˙(p, β∗2(u), DT ) that asso-
ciates to each clearing price a set of possible strategies for player 122.
Remembering that β1(u(s1)) = pNC and applyng the inverse mapping
M−1 the (PSP) can be reduced to a function of the single variable pNC :
max
pNC
Π1
(
pNC , s1(M
−1)
)
= max
pNC
Π1 (pNC , s1(pNC))
s.t. pNC ≤ P
and if a bidding strategies that maximizes (PSP) exists there will also be a
continuum of solutions. The next proposition characterizes the solution
of the (PSP):
22In other words, the map M is the inverse of the outcome function
O(β1(u), β∗2 (u), DT ) restricted to final prices.
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Proposition3 (PSP) admits always a continuum of solutions and the price so-
lution is a discontinuity point in the domain of the (PSP) function.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Given the existence of (at least) a solution to the PSP problem, now it
can be possible to characterize the equilibrium of the game for the case
L>D. For this purpose it is useful to define the following quantities:
Definition2 Indicate with u =
{
minu :
u∑
u=1
ku ≥ D
}
and u ={
minu :
u∑
u=1
ku ≥ DU
}
.
These quantities represent, for a firm, the last generating unit that must
be activated to satisfy alone, respectively, its zonal demand and the total
market demand. Under the initial assumption that D1 = D2 = D and
DT ∈ [0, 2K] than the first quantity u is always defined, while the second
quantity umay be not. However this last case perfectly coincide with the
case of a limited transmission capacity L described in the next section. In
fact when a firm located in one zone is not able to cover completely total
market demand, this means that there is an irreducible residual share for
the competitor in its injection zone. For this reason, in this section, it is
assumed that the quantity u exists, while the other case is integrated in
the successive paragraph. The next proposition establishes the existence
and the characteristic of the pure strategy equilibrium of the game for
the case L>D.
Proposition4 There exists at least a pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game
when L = +∞. Moreover any pure equilibrium, results in the alloca-
tion 0 < Di ≤ D ≤ D−i where player i = 1 is the price-setter and
player−i = 2 the price taker and pU = cu with u ∈ [u, u¯] .
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Proposition 4 characterizes the equilibrium allocation and highlights the
trade-off previously described for the price setter. A direct consequence
of the equilibrium allocation is indicated by the following:
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Corollary2 Any pure strategy equilibrium of the game would result in
Π2(pNC , D−i) ≥ Π2(pNC , Di).
Proof: This is straightforward since the price is the same for both players
but s2 ≥ s1.`
The detection of the equilibrium (or equilibria) of the game is a tedious
work, since it requires to check for the price-setter all the possible strate-
gies where a jump in the demand occurs in correspondence of variations
of the market clearing price. In other words, also if the equilibrium price
must be found in a limited number of discontinuity points of the profit
function, the strategies that implies a “jump” of the residual demand of
player 1 must be found among a higher number of strategies, which in-
creases as the number of generating units U and demand D increases.
A simple algorithm (“Scan Algorithm”) that can be used for the equilib-
rium detection is showed in Appendix 3, while an equilibrium allocation
is shown for instance in Figure 17 below, with the parameters of the mo-
del reported in the attached Table.
Figure 17: Asymmetric equilibrium with no transmission constraints
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Proposition 4 does not rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria.
These arise when, in the comparison between two discontinuity points
of the PSP function, the losses for the price setter due to a demand re-
duction (“jump”) are totally offset by the gain deriving from an increase
of the market clearing price. Whenever this happens the price-setter is
indifferent among multiple allocations. The uniqueness of the solution
will depend on the demand, the cost function and the capacity of the gen-
erating units. In Appendix 4 are derived a set of conditions (U.C.) that
involves these three variables and guarantees the uniqueness of the equi-
librium. For the rest of the paper it will be assumed that the equilibrium
allocation is always unique23.
Notice that Corollary 2 generates always an incentive for both player
to act as a price-taker in equilibrium. This implies the existence of a
mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, which is symmetric and requires
player to choose the marginal cost pricing (or an outcome equivalent
strategy) with some probability p and the allocation indentified by the
previous mechanism with probability (1−p). In other words, generators
randomize between the price-taker and the price-setter role.
With regard to the social desirability of the equilibrium, the asym-
metric allocation generates always higher costs with respect to the equal
division of the total demand among the firms. Indeed, the economic
“withholding” of some generating units by the price-setter entails the
activation of more expensive (higher marginal cost) generating units of
the price-taker. This is reported in the next proposition:
Proposition5 The total welfare is maximized when the allocation is symmetric.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
The higher the substitution of the cheaper power units of the price-setter
with the most expensive units of the price-taker, the higher is the inef-
ficiency related to the asymmetric equilibrium. This is the direct conse-
quence of proposition 5:
23Notwithstanding, there is always a continuum of bidding strategies for both players
that end up with the equilibrium allocation.
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Corollary3: The inefficiency of the equilibrium increases with the asymmetry
of the final allocation.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Equilibrium Analysis when 0 < L < D
When the transmission capacity is limited to L < D, D + L is the maxi-
mum amount of power that a single generator can supply to the market.
In this case each operator conserves in its area an irreducible residual
demand that cannot be satisfied by the other firm. Whenever the line
is congested, i.e. the amount of power flowing on the transmission line
is given exactly by L, the zones separate and record different clearing
prices, indicated by p1for the zone Z1and p2for the zone Z2. In partic-
ular the net import zone will have a higher clearing price than the net
export zone. Contrarily, when the line is not congested there will be a
single price in the market, indicated by pC . For a given L and D define
the following quantities:
Definition3 Indicate with ←−u =
{
minu :
←−u∑
u=1
ku ≥ D − L
}
and −→u ={
minu :
−→u∑
u=1
ku ≥ D + L
}
the marginal units necessary to produce re-
spectively the quantities of power D + L and D − L.
As the analysis will show, the role of the quantities in definition 3 will be
the same as of u e u for the case L ≥ D. However, differently from the
previous section,←−u and−→u now defines respectively the minimal and the
maximal units that a power generator can activate in the net importing
and net exporting zone.
Consider now player 2 adopting a strategy which is outcome equiva-
lent to the marginal cost pricing. In other words, assign to this player the
role of “price-taker” as discussed in the previous section. It is straightfor-
ward to observe that, for this player, the optimal bidding strategy up to
the unit −→u is similar to the strategy for the case of L unlimited discussed
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in the previous section. This similarity is revealed in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition6 Any strategies which is outcome equivalent to the marginal cost
pricing for all u < −→u is part of a best response strategy of the player i in
the case that si ≥ D ≥ s−i.
Proof: See Appendix 5.
For the case 0 < L < D, proposition 6 plays the same role of proposition
2 for the first −→u units. Any attempt of player 1 to increase the (unique)
market clearing price is optimally replied with a marginal pricing by the
competitor. Coherently with Corollary1, the minimum amount that will
be produced by player 2 in equilibrium will be given by D. The difference
with respect to the previous case is that if player 1 attemps to increase
the market clearing price above c−→u the line becomes congested and its
residual demand now shrinks to (D − L). In other words, by increasing
further the price above c−→u , firm 1 can accomodate the exportations of
the other firm and still conserve a positive market share. This results in
a final allocation that awards a quantity (D-L) to player 1 (with marginal
unit←−u ) and (D+L) to player 2 (with marginal unit −→u ) and, since the two
zones separate, in two clearing prices with p1 > p2 ≥ c−→u .
At a first glance it seems natural to think that, whenever this strat-
egy is profitable, player 1 would offer its marginal unit ←−u and set the
clearing price in its zone at the highest value admitted by the pool, i.e.
P the price ceiling. However this does not represent an equilibrium of
the game. The reason is that player 2 now has an incentive to keep the
line congested and increasing the price on its marginal unit −→u slightly
below the marginal bid of its competitor. In fact, suppose that firm 1 is
playing with probability equals to 1 a strategy that would result in the
price P in its zone. Than player 2 would stay better off by pricing all
its units u < −→u at their marginal cost and setting the price in its zone
with β2(−→u ) = P − ε with ε small enough. But now firm 1 has, in turn,
an incentive to reduce the price on its marginal unit to β1(←−u ) = β2(−→u ).
Given the acceptence and priority rules adopted by the power exchange
(see point b), this will result in an increase of the residual demand of firm
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1 to some s1 > (D−L), a “decongestion” of the power line and the deter-
mination (again) of a unique market clearing price. Therefore it is clear
that, on their marginal units, the two firms will start a ‘Bertrand-like’
competition with the intent of capturing a higher share of the demand.
This leads to the conclusion that whenever a generator attempts to clear
its zonal market with a price higher than c−→u , there does not exist a pure
strategy equilibrium with increasing supply function.
Like in the previous section, proposition 6 can be used to derive the
optimal problem for player 1:
max
β1(u)
Π1 (β1(u(s1)), s1(β1(u), β2(u)) =
β1(u(s1)s1 ((β1(u(s1)), β2(u))− C (s1(β1(u), β2(u)) (PSP − L)
s.t.
(i) β1(u(s1)) ≤ P
(ii) β2(u) = cu ∀u < −→u
In order to derive the optimal strategy for both players, notice that
Proposition 3 still applies here up to the point where the price for the
marginal unit of palyer 1 does not exceed c−→u . Up to this point the profit
function in (PSP-L) has the same form of (PSP). Indeed it is continuous
but in a finite number of points and is increasing over a fnite number of
intervals. Moreover, given the strategy of player 2 for the first−→u −1 units,
the (PSP-L) admits always at least a solution if restricted to pL ≤ c−→u . Up
to this point the equilibrium behaviour of generator 2 is known and the
residual demand of 1 is uniquely determined by the price he requires for
its marginal unit. Consider now the following definition:
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Definition4 Let 〈pz, s1(pz)〉 be the allocation that maximizes (PSP − L) s.t.
(i) β1(u(s1)) ≤ c−→u and (ii) β2(u) = cu ∀u < −→u .
Definition 4 identifies the highest profit achievable by player 1 in the situ-
ation where the probability of congestion is null (i.e. PSP-L is constrained
toβ1(u(s1)) ≤ c−→u ) and player 2 is playing its best response function. In
this case the residual demand of player 1 amounts to some s1 > D − L
and a single price pz clear both zones. This profit defines a pay-off thresh-
old24 for player 1 (“outside option”) that determines the type of the equi-
librium solution. In particular if, for player 1, an increase of the price of
the marginal offer to some value above c−→u is profitable, we will observe
both players randomize with some probability distribution their pricing
strategy for their marginal unit. As a consequence, the congestion of the
power line and the separation of the two zones may emerge as the result
of firms price randomization and, in particular, if the clearing price in
net importing zone is strictly higher than the price in the net exporting
zone. Conversely, if the attempt of increasing the price above c−→u is never
profitable for player 1, the final allocation of the game is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium with outcomes indicated in Definition 4. This is the
statement of the next proposition:
Proposition7 Suppose that (U.C.) holds for (PSP ). The equilibrium of the
game is as follow:
• If Π1(P ,D − L) ≤ Π1 (pz, s1(pz)) there exist a Nash pure strat-
egy equilibrium of the game where the pay-off of player 1 is given by
Π1 (pz, s1(pz)) and that of player 2 is given instead by Π2(pz, s2(pz)).
The price is unique and given by pz and the line is never congested.
• If Π1(P ,D − L) > Π1 (pz, s1(pz))there does not exist a pure strat-
egy equilibrium. The equilibrium of the game, if exists, is in mixed
strategies where the expected pay-off of player 1 is given by some A1 >
Π1 (pz, s1(pz)) and that of player 2 is A2 > Π2(pz, s2(pz)). Whenever
the price is unique it is at least equal to some P > pz and the power line
24Under the validity of (U.C.) conditions in Appendix 4, this threshold is uniquely de-
fined.
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is not congested, otherwise it must be that p1 > p2 ≥ P and the power
line is congested.
Proof: See Appendix 5.
Proposition 7 indicates how the equilibrium solution varies according to
the parameters of the model. For instance, an increase of the price ceil-
ing, as well as a reduction of the power transmission capacity, implies,
ceteris paribus the other parameters, a higher likelihood of observing
mixed strategies in equilibrium and market separations. Interestingly,
the incentives to play asymmetric strategies is intrinsic into the model,
while the capacity of the power line just affects their magnitude.
As already discussed in the previous section, the case of a limited
transmission capacity can be “translated” in the case where the power
line is unlimited but the level of demand implies the existence of a resid-
ual market share for the players25. In such situations, the higher the
residual demand (the difference between total demand and the maxi-
mum capacity of the generator) the higher the likelihood of observing
mixed strategies in equilibrium and higher mark-ups on the marginal
units costs.
To conclude this section, it is important to note that the Proposition
5 and corollary 3 remain for the case just described. This implies that
the profitability of strategies that may end up in an equilibrium with a
congestion of the power line, generates, from a welfare point of view,
higher level of inefficiency with respect to the optimal allocation under
the constrained (PSP-L). The policy implications of the model are dis-
cussed deeper in the next section, while the equilibrium solutions and
allocations of the game are derived in Appendix 6.
4.4 Policy Implications and Comparative Stat-
ics
This section discusses how the equilibrium allocation is affected by a
change of the parameters of the model and the policy intervention aimed
25Consider the case where DT > K the total capacity of a generator.
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at increasing the social welfare. In particular two parameters will be dis-
cussed in this section: the power line capacity (L) and the price ceiling
(P ). These parameters are generally included in the set of instrument
that can be directly used by policy makers for regulatory purpose. In-
deed, the price ceiling is generally chosen to reflect the value of lost load
(VOLL) for consumers in case of scarcity events26. Similarly the expan-
sion of the power line capacity is normally included in the objectives of
the TSOs and is finalized to increase the security of supply in different
geographic zones.
If, on the one hand, it seems normal to think investments in transmis-
sion capacity as always beneficial for total welfare, the model indicates
that this may not be the case. Indeed by Corollary 3, we know that the
social benefits are inversely related to the asymmetry of the equilibrium
allocation. For this reason, the perfect monopoly case (L=0) implies al-
ways the highest social efficiency. This is due to the fact that both firms
will always play symmetric strategies that result in a clearing price in
each zone equals to the price ceiling: the symmetry is always guaranteed
but the total surplus is entirely captured by the firms. Similarly, when-
ever the level of asymmetry reached by the equilibrium allocation when
the line has unlimited capacity is higher that in a congestion case, having
a reduced capacity in transmission may be socially preferred. The rea-
son is that an unlimited transmission may allow for a higher variety of
asymmetric equilibrium with some of those resulting in a firm producing
a quantity less than (D−L) - the minimum quantity in case of congestion
- and the other firm (D+L) - the maximum quantity under congestion. In
these cases, having a limited capacity of transmission forces a generator
to produce in its zone a higher quantity in equilibrium with a resulting
reduction of the asymmetry.
In term of the model, this happens when Π1 (pz, s1(pz)) is differ-
ent from the allocation that maximizes (PSP), since the latter must oc-
cur at some s1 ≤ (D − L) and s2 ≥ (D + L). Note that the condition
Π1
(
P¯ ,D − L) = Π1 (P , s1(c−→u )) implies that as L increases P , the lower
bound of the price randomization support, is driven down. For policy
26Leading, for instance, to a disruption of the forniture to final consumers.
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maker than there might be a trade-off between a reduction of the social
welfare and the control of market power. Indeed if an increase of the
capacity of the power line may, on one hand, coordinate firms on highly
asymmetric equilibria, on the other hand, lower prices are included into
the support of mixed strategies that may occur in equilibrium. These
situations are more likely to occur the higher the price ceiling and the
variance of firm’s marginal costs (See Figure 18):
Figure 18: Asymmetric equilibrium is more likely in case (a) where the
variance of firms marginal costs is higher
Contrarily, in the cases where the capacity of the transmission line just
creates an artificial monopoly for one of the two firms, the development
of additional transmission capacity improves the social welfare and re-
duces market power. This is true when Π1 (pz, s1(pz))coincides with the
allocation that maximizes (PSP). To see these results, consider first that
the equilibrium of the game generates, with some positive probability, a
congestion of the power line whenever firms play mixed strategies. The
condition under which the adoption of mixed strategies is profitable for
both firm is indicated in proposition 7 by Π1(P ,D−L) > Π1 (pz, s1(pz)).
For a given D, this condition defines a threshold value L such that for
any L ≥ L any attempt to congest the power line is never profitable for
the price setter. The value of L is the solution to the condition:
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L−
(
C(L)
P
)
= D −
(
1
P
)
[pzs1(pz)− C (s1(pz)) + C(D)]
and the additional investment from the current level of capacity is
given by L − L. When transmission capacity reaches L players have no
more incentive to deviate (unilaterally) from the equilibrium allocation
〈s∗1(p∗z); s∗2(p∗z), p∗z〉and additional investments do not have any impact on
final outcomes. With P defined in proposition 7, the equilibrium prices
as function of L can be here summarized:
(p1, p2) =

p1 = p2 = P L = 0
P ≥ p1 ≥ p2 ≥ P > pz L < L
P > p1 = p2 = pz L ≥ L
In terms of total welfare, by Corollary 3, the equilibrium
〈s∗1(p∗z); s∗2(p∗z), p∗z〉 weakly dominates the result of the mixed strategies,
since s1(pz) ≥ s1(p1) and s2(pz) ≤ s2(p2). When the transmission capac-
ity reaches L thus the incentives for players to switch to mixed strategies
are removed, the clearing price reduces and the total welfare is driven
up.
Given the probability distribution of D, it is possible to define a ca-
pacity target for policy makers L∗ given by the solution to the equation:
L∗ −
(
C(L∗)
P
)
= E(D)−
(
1
P
)
{pzs∗1(pz)− C (s∗1(pz)) + E [C(D)]}
and the additional investment from the current level of capacity is
given by L−L∗. The capacity target depends positively on the price cap
and on the expected level of the demand. Consequently, policy makers
may control market power and increase the social welfare by mixing ad-
ditional investments in capacity with a reduction of the maximum price
accepted by the power exchange.
85
4.5 Conclusion
This paper introduces a basic model to study firm strategic behaviors
in a day-ahead market based on zonal pricing with grid transmission
constraints. The results show that, in equilibrium, asymmetric strategies
may be adopted by the firms even with an unlimited transmission ca-
pacity. The incentives to play asymmetrically induce the economic with-
holding of some power units with the intent of increasing the market
clearing prices. From a social point of view asymmetric allocations are
inefficient, since they impose the activation of more expensive generation
units to cover total demand. A limited capacity of the power line on the
one hand preserves the incentive to play asymmetric strategies and, on
the other hand, increases the market power of the firms. The latter have
an additional incentive given by the possibility to induce a congestion
of the power line and further increase the price in their zone. However,
in order to be marginal in its own zone, a firm must not mimic, with its
marginal unit, the price strategy of its competitor and decongesting the
power line. This results in firms playing asymmetric mixed strategies in
equilibrium. In terms of social welfare, interventions aimed at increasing
the capacity of the power line may lead to different conclusions accord-
ing to the parameters that characterize the cost function of the firms. In
particular, players may reach an equilibrium allocation which is more
asymmetric when the transmission capacity is unlimited with respect to
the case where transmission constraints are binding. The intuition is that
a limited transmission capacity reduces the possibility of economic with-
holding of power units. In these situations, investing in transmission
capacity may reduce market power but, at the same time, increase the
inefficiency of the final allocation. Alternatively, when the constraints
on the transmission capacity creates a mere monopolistic position on a
residual demand, policy-makers may reduce market power and increase
social welfare by intervening both on the transmission limits and regu-
lating the maximum price accepted by the pool.
Well away from being exhaustive, the framework introduced in the
previous sections offers a starting point for studying firms’ strategies in
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the context of a multi-unit auction model. The paper can be enriched in
several directions to take into account a number of complexities of the
current electricity markets. Among these, the introduction of more play-
ers inside one or both zones, a more complex network configuration27 or
allowing for real-time uncertainty of the demand.
27Consider for instance 3 or more zones
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4.6 Appendix Chapter 3
Appendix 1: The Economic Merit Order in the Day-Ahead
Electricity Market
The day-ahead market is run by a Power Exchange through an auction
mechanism. Generators submit a finite number of bids, each containing
the minimum unit-price at which they are willing to sell power, and the
maximum quantity offered at that price, for any relevant time of the next
day28. The pool collects the bids and establishes a merit order based
on the price-ascending ranking, constructing so an aggregate supply of
electricity at any time interval.
On the other side of the market, purchasers submit a pair of num-
bers containing the maximum price they are willing to pay for power,
and the maximum quantity they are willing to buy at that price. Anal-
ogously, the bids are collected in a price-descending order by the pool,
and an aggregate demand is created. In each period, demand and sup-
ply determine the equilibrium quantity that will be dispatched and the
generating units that will be called to operate, while the price paid to the
generators instead will depend on the particular format adopted for the
auction. A discriminatory or “pay-as-bid" auction results, in case of ac-
ceptance, in the supplier be paid the price he submitted for supply that
amount of electricity. A uniform or SMP - system marginal pricing - auc-
tion will instead generate a unique price for all suppliers, given by the
price submitted by the marginal (generating) unit accepted by the power
exchange29.
28It must be noted that there is no a standard organization of the market that remains
valid worldwide. Every jurisdiction indeed, regulates the wholesale market in a different
way. For instance, in the IPEX (the Italian Power Exchange) generators are allowed to bid
up to four pairs price-quantity for each hour of the day and for each generating unit, while
in the PJM the maximum number of pairs admitted is ten (per genset). Electricity auctions
differ also in the duration of suppliers’ bids. While in Australia and Argentina these remain
valid for a given period of time during which demand changes (“long-lived" bids), in the
case of the Italian, Spanish and Nordic markets, demand and supply are constructed by
collecting the bids in any relevant period (“short-lived" bids), generally any 24 hours. A
reader can find an overview of the different approaches commonly used in the electricity
market in (31).
29The pay-as-bid format has been adopted in England and Wales since March 2001,
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Appendix 2: Proofs for the case L>D
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (βi(u), β−i(u)) be a profile of strategies such
that for player i = 1 β1(u) = bu < cu for some u’s. Let the resulting allo-
cation be O(β1(u), β2(u), D) = (s1, s2, pNC) where pNC = maxi β(u(si)).
Now for player 1 any u’s for which bu < cu must be positioned in one of
this two subsets:
1. If u > u(s1), the unit will not be called to dispatch power and will
not affect the profit function of the firm. Consequently increasing
the bid for this unit up to its marginal cost will not change the pay-
off.
2. If u ≤ u(s1), this unit will be called to dispatch power. Let
Π0(pNC , s1) = pNCs1 − C(s1) be the profit of generator 1 under
the strategy β1(u). Suppose now that player 1 were to switch to the
strategy β
′
1(u) = cu for all u’s initially priced below the marginal
cost and β
′
1(u) = β1(u) for all other u’s. Since generator 1 is in-
creasing the price of some units and the bidding function is increas-
ing for both players, than the new allocation will give an equilib-
rium price not lower than pNC . So indicating the price under the
new allocation with p
′
NC we have that p
′
NC ≥ pNC . Because of the
price increase the quantity produced by generator 1 and 2 would
become s
′
1 = s1 − 4 and s
′
2 = s2 + 4, with 4 ≥ 0. In particu-
lar, if pNC > cu(s1) (the cost of the marginal unit of generator 1)
than all units that were initially priced lower than pNC were al-
ready called to dispatch power at full capacity and adopting the
marginal cost strategy would not change the previous final alloca-
tion, i.e4 = 0 and p′NC = pNC . If pNC ≤ cu(s1) the new allocation
may change the final quantities of the firms, given now by the pair(
s
′
1, s
′
2
)
. In this case the new price would be bounded above by
the unit cost of the marginal unit of player 1, that is it must be
valid that cu(s1) ≥ p
′
NC ≥ pNC . The profit of generator 1 after the
while SMP is currently run, among the others, in Italy, Spain and New England (NEPOOL).
A theoretical comparison, in terms of efficiency, between Pay-as-bid and SMP can be found
in (32).
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reallocation would be so given by Π1(p
′
NC , s
′
1) = p
′
NCs
′
1 − C(s
′
1).
The difference in payoffs under the two strategies is Π1 − Π0 =
s1(p
′
NC − pNC) − p
′
NC4 + (C(s1) − C(s
′
1)). If pU ≤ cu(D1) notice
that, by construction of the cost function, and since under the new
strategy all the units priced below p
′
NC would always be called
to dispatch at their full capacity, the following equality must hold
C(s1)− C(s′1) = cu(s1)4. So finally we have:
Π1 −Π0 = s1(p′NC − pNC)︸ ︷︷ ︸+
≥0
4(cu(s1) − p
′
NC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0
which leads to a contradiction. The first term is the gain due to the
fact that the price under the new strategy is higher for all the units,
while the second term is the gain due to the fact that the firm is no
more selling some units at a price lower than the cost. `
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose not and let (β1(u), β2(u)) be a pair of
strategies of the game, where player 2 is the price taker and β2(u) 6= cu
for some u. From Proposition 1, bidding some unit below the marginal
cost is a weakly dominated strategy so it would never be played. If
player 1 is the only price-setter it must be that maxi β(u(si)) = β1(u(s1)).
So consider first the case where β1(u) > cu for some u’s. Under this
strategies profile the pay-off of player 2 is given by Π0(β1(u(s1), s2). Now
suppose that for player 2 there is a u such that β1(u(s1)) > β2(u) > cu,
thus in this case pricing u to its marginal cost would not change the equi-
librium price and allocations. Suppose now that β2(u) > β1(u(s1)) > cu
for some u’s and let u˜ be the first among these u′s. In this case let player 2
playing a strategy β
′
2(u) where β
′
2(u˜) = cu˜. Notice that in this case the de-
mand of player 1 must reduce to some s
′
1 < s1. Since player 1 is the price
setter than in equilibrium it must still be β1(u(s
′
1) = β2 (u (s1)) = pNC .
Given that the units priced below this equilibrium price will be accepted,
with the new strategy the quantity produced by player 2 increases to
s
′
2 =
u˜∑
u=1
ku. The payoff of player 2 with the new strategy is given by
Π1(pNC , s
′
2). So finally we have
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Π1 −Π0 = β1(u(s1))[s′2 − s2]− (C(s
′
2)− C(s2)) > 0
since by construction of the cost function c(s
′
2) = cu˜, cu˜(s
′
2 − s2) ≥
(C(s
′
2)− C(s2)) and pNC > cu˜.`
Proof of Corollary 1. From proposition 2 the price-taker will play a
strategy which is outcome equivalent to the marginal cost pricing and
from proposition 1 the price-setter will never bid its units below their
marginal cost. By playing the marginal cost stategy (or an outcome
equivalent strategy), the price-setter will be sure to dispatch a quan-
tity equals to D. If the price-setter increases the prices of some units its
reasidual demand falls to s1 ≤ D. Finally, the market clearing condition
DT = s1 + s2 implies that s2 ≥ D.P
Proof of Proposition 3. For the existence of the solution notice tha pN
varies over
[
0, P¯
]
and than the profit function varies over a compact
space. Now notice that the profit function is always continuous with
respect to the clearing price but in a finite number of points, that is,
it is continuous on intervals. Moreover in any interval the function is
strictly increasing with respect to the clearing price. To see this, let pNC
and p
′
NCbe the result of two different allocations with p
′
NC = pNC + ε,
with ε → 0. The profit of the price setter will be Π
(
p
′
NC , s1(p
′
NC)
)
>
Π (pNC , s1(pNC)) as long as s1(pNC) = s1(p
′
NC) and continuosly increas-
ing the clearing price the price-setter can assure itself a higher profit up
to the point where his demand reduces. Now let pNC be a price such that
there is a jump in the demand to s1(pNC) > s1(p
′
NC), than for ε small
enough limpNC+ Π(pNC , s1(pNC)) 6= limpNC− Π(pNC , s1(pNC)) and pNC
is a discontinuity point. So in any discontinuity point but the last, where
s1(pNC) = 0, the profit function jumps and increases continuously up to a
new point where the residual demand of the price setter reduces and that
of the price-taker increases. As long as U is finite, the number of disconti-
nuity point is also finite. Moreover since the function is increasing on any
continuos interval, the discontinuity point must be the maximizer over
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that interval. Let Π1 = Π1 (p∗, s1(p∗)) be the highets profit computed
among all the possible discontinuity points, thus any strategy which re-
sults in a clearing price β1 (u (s1)) = p∗ represent a solution of the (PSP).
`
Proof of Proposition 4 By Proposition 2 the price-taker will play a strat-
egy which is outcome equivalent to the marginal cost pricing, so consider
that β2(u) = cu∀u ∈ U . This implies that the profit function in (PSP ) is
characterized by U discontinuity points, each corresponding to a market
clearing price pNC = cu. By proposition 3 the maximum of the (PSP )
must be evaluated among the U discontinuity points. Note that any al-
location resulting in a price pNC < cuis not optimal. To see this, suppose
that this is the case and so it must be that β1(u(s1)) = pNC < cu, and
necessarily s1 > D > s2. By Corollary 1 this allocation cannot result
to be an equilibrium since generator 1 is pricing some units below their
marginal cost and u(s1) ≥ u implies that on the marginal unit the price-
setter is making losses. So in equilibrium it must be that pNC ≥ cu and
s2 ≥ D ≥ s1. It is straightforward to see that pNC > cu cannot be an equi-
librium neither. Indeed under the assumption DT < K there must be so
a unit u¯ with which each generator is able to satisfy all the market de-
mand. For the price-setter pricing some unit above cu would just imply
a reduction of his demand without resulting in a higher clearing-price,
since its marginal unit would be some u ≤ u. To see this, let β1(u), β∗2(u)
an allocation such that β1(u(s1)) = cu and the demand of 1 is s1(cu). The
profit of 1 than is given by Π (cu, s1(cu)). Let now generator 1 to increase
the price on the marginal unit to p′ = cu + ε. The new marginal unit that
clears the market so would be some u˜ ≤ u and the resulting price is some
pNC ≤ cu¯. The demand of player 1 shrinks to some s1 < D(cu) since
he is loosing a potential production on the marginal unit, and clearly
Π (cu, s1(cu)) > Π
(
p
′
, s1(p
′
)
)
. So the equilibrium strategies must maxi-
mize the profit function of 1 in (PSP) in some discontinuity points where
the clearing price assumes value pNC ∈
[
cu, cu
]
(See Figure 19)`
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Figure 19: Graphical representation of the PSP function
Figure 19 shows a graphical representation of the PSP function. As one can observe, any allocation
resulting in a price p∗ < cu is not optimal since, at the margin, player 1 is bearing losses.
Conversely, any allocation resulting in a market clearing price higher than cu leads to zero the
residual demand of player 1. When the price is equal to cu BR3 applies and players equally share
the total market demand. For the range of prices included in the set
[
cu, cu
]
, the solution of the
PSP must be find among the discontinuity points, in the upper bounds of the intervals. Contrarily
to the locus where s1 > D, in this range the PSP jumps to a lower value after an infinitesimal
increase of the price in correspondence of a discontinuity point.
Proof of Proposition 5 The welfare function is given by W = (P −
pNC)DT + pNCs1 + pNCs2 − (C(s1) + C(s2)). Employing the clearing
condition, the maximization problem with respect to pNC can be written
as
max
pNC
W = PDT − [C (s1(pNC)) + C (DT − s1(pNC))]
The F.O.C defines the condition C ′(s1(pz)) = C ′ (DT − s1(pz))which is
verified when the marginal unit is the same. `
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Proof of Corollary 3 Let s1 and s2 be an allocation of the game. The
welfare distortion from the optimal allocation is given byC(s1)+C(s2)−
2C(D). From the clearing condition the allocation can be rewritten as
C(s1) + C(DT − s1)− 2C(D) ≥ 0
with a maximum equal to C(D) when s1 = 0 and s2 = DT (or viceversa).
`
Appendix 3: The “Scan” Algorithm for the Equilibrium
Detection.
The pseudo algorithm is constructed as:
• For the price-taker let β2(u) = cu ∀u ∈ U .
• For the price setter, follow these steps:
1. Let β1(u) =
{
cu ∀u ≤ u
cu ∀u > u
In this case the allocation for both player is the same and is
given by the pair
〈
cu, D
〉
. The marginal unit is u(s1) = u(s2) =
u(D) = u and pNC = cu.
2. Increase the prices of all units below u up to the unit cost of
the next to the marginal unit of player 2. That is play:
β1(u) =
{
cu+1 ∀u ≤ u+ 1
cu ∀u > u+ 1
In this case the demand of player 1 reduces while the de-
mand of the price-taker increases with respect to the previ-
ous step, that is s1 < D < s2. Consequently the marginal
units are ranked u(s1) ≤ u ≤ u(s2) . Business Rule b) en-
sures that player 1 is the price setter and the clearing price is
β1(u(s1)) = c(u+1). Record the new allocation pair of player
1with
〈
c(u+1), s1
〉
.
3. For any c(u+j) such that c(u+1) < c(u+j) ≤ cu¯ repeat Step 2 and
increase the price of all units up to the (u+ j) unit:
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β1(u) =
{
cu+j ∀u ≤ u+ j
cu ∀u > u+ j
In any of these steps the demand of player 1 shrinks in behalf
of player 2. Any allocation so results in s1 < D < s2 and
u(s1) < u < u(s2) and a clearing price given by β1(u(s1)) =
c(u+j). Record the new allocations
〈
c(u+j), s1
〉 ∀c(u+j)
4. Any further increase that occur beyond cu¯ would result in
s1 = 0 and a profit null for player 1. Evaluate the profit func-
tion Π(pNC , s1) in all the allocations previously recorded and
find the maximum (or maxima if the allocation is not unique).
The pair of bidding functions (β∗1 , β∗1):
β∗1(u) = cu∀u
β∗1(u) =
{
cu+j ∀u ≤ u+ j
cu ∀u > u+ j
for some j ∈ {0, ..., [u− u]}
represents a Nash pure strategy equilibrium of the game.
Appendix 4: Conditions for the uniqueness of the equilib-
rium allocation.
This Appendix discusses the conditions that guarantee the uniqueness
of the equilibrium solution. First note that any final allocation requires
a different set of operating units called to dispatch power, each of them
characterized by specific parameters (capacity and size). Since the model
impose no restrictions on the number and/or the technical characteristics
of the units, a general condition for the uniqueness of the solution cannot
be derived. Therefore, what is here proposed is a condition that must be
valid in any pairwise comparison of the discontinuity points in the do-
main of the (PSP) function. Notice that, given the best response strategy
of player 2, the discontinuity points coincide with the number of steps
characterizing the cost curve of the firms. In particular, proposition 4 re-
stricts the comparison to a number of (u− u)discontinuity points, among
which the (PSP) reaches its maximum.
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Consider than two different allocations given by (pa, sa) and (pb, sb)
where pb > pa and sb < sa and let the profit of player 1 be given by
Π(pa, sa) and Π(pb, sb). The difference between the latter produces:
Π(pa, sa)−Π(pb, sb) = casa − cbsb − [C (sa)− C(sb)]
where ca and cb are the marginal costs of some units a and b with b > a
since pb > pa. Given the strategy of the price taker, the residual demands
of the price setter can be written as sa = DT −
a−1∑
u=1
ku and sb = DT −
b−1∑
u=1
ku
and by construction of the cost function [C (sa)− C(sb)] =
b−1∑
u=a
cuku. The
uniqueness of the equilibrium solution is than provided by the condition:
DT 6=
(
cb
b−1∑
u=1
ku − ca
a−1∑
u=1
)
−
b−1∑
u=a
cuku
cb − ca (U.C.)
which must hold in any pairwise comparison of the units included in
the interval (u− u).
Appendix 5: Proofs for the case 0<L<D
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose not and let (β1(u), β2(u)) be a couple
of strategies resulting in a final allocation where player 2 has a residual
demand given by s2 ≥ D ≥ s1. By Proposition 1 both players will never
price their units lower than the marginal cost and than β2(u) ≥ cu for
all u′s. Notice that if the line is congested, there will be two prices in
equilibrium and the price in zone 2 is given by p2 = β2(−→u ). In this case,
since the supply functions are increasing, all units below−→u will be called
to dispatch power and so bidding all of them at their marginal cost has
no impact on profits.
In the case where there is a single market price the unit −→u of player
2 will not be called to dispatch power. Suppose, in this case, that the
clearing price is given by β2(u(s2)) = pC 6= β1(u(s1)) for some u(s2) <−→u and let pL > cu(s2). Notice that if player 2 is the only price setter
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than u(s1) 6= u(s2) and necessarily the only possible allocation implies
s2 > D > s1 and u(s2) > u(s1). Therefore pC > cu for all u ∈ [1, u(s2)]
and so player 1 by deviating to
β
′
1(u) =
{
β1(u) ∀u ≤ u(s1)
max {pC , cu} u > u(s1)
will increase its pay-off (and reducing that of player 2) since he increases
his residual demand without reducing the equilibrium price. But this
strategy is always feasible for player1 as long as pL > cu(s2), which leads
to a contradiction for β2(u) as a best response strategy of player 2.
Finally, consider the caseβ1(u(s1)) = pC30. Now for player 2 those u’s
which are priced above their marginal cost, and have been accepted to
dispatch power under this equilibrium price, will continue to dispatch
power also if the price bid for them reduces to the marginal cost. In
this case lowering the bidding price does not change the final alloca-
tion. On the contrary suppose that there are some units priced above
the marginal costs that are initially not called to dispatch. In the case
β2(u) > β1(u(s1)) > cu for some u’s consider the following deviation for
player 2:
β
′
2(u) =
{
β2(u) ∀u ≤ u(s2)
max {pL − ε, cu} u > u(s2)
For ε small enough, the pay-off of player 2 under this new srategies is
never lower than under the strategy β2(u) since with some positive prob-
ability player 2 is going to increase its residual demand, which leads to a
contradiction for β2(u) as a best response strategy of player 2. `
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider the following cases:
Case 1: Π1(P ,D − L) ≤ Π1 (pz, s1(pz))
Suppose player 1 wants to increase the clearing price in its zone by of-
fering its marginal unit at a price higher than c−→u . Depending on the
30This does not exclude the case β1(u(s1)) = β2(u(s2)) = pC
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behavior of player 2 two possible allocations for player 1 may occur:
(1) the residual demand of player 1 shrinks to s1 = (D − L) > s1(pz)
and β1(←−u )>β2(−→u ) resulting than in a congestion of the power line or
(2) the demand of player is s1(p = c−→u ) and β1(
←−u ) ≤ β2(−→u ). In the
former allocation, the highest profit achievable by player 1 is given by
Π1(P ,D − L) with a bid for the marginal unit←−u β(←−u ) = P = p1(price
in zone 1). Given the initial condition, a deviation that concludes in
this allocation is never preferable than the allocation Π1 (pz, s1(pz)). In-
deed even if Π1(P ,D − L)=Π1 (pz, s1(pz)) the outcome
〈
P ,D − L〉 for
player 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium since player 2 has an incen-
tive to cut its rival price. To see this notice that since s1(pz) ≥ s1(c−→u )
(the residual demand of player 1 when the price is equal c−→u ) and since
Π1(P , s1(c−→u )) > Π1(P ,D − L) than there exists a P0 with P > P0 > c−→u
such that Π1 (P0, s1(c−→u )) = Π1 (pz, s1(pz)). Therefore by lowering the
marginal unit offer below P0 player 2 can still get a profit higher than
Π2
(
c−→u ,, s2(c−→u )
)
, but player 1 now has an incentive to play again a strat-
egy resulting in the allocation 〈pz, s1(pz)〉.
In the second allocation, the highest profit reachable by player 1 is
Π1
(
P , s1(c−→u )
)
with no congestion and a single market price given by
pC = P . Note that even if this profit is higher than Π1 (pz, s1(pz))the
strategy β1(←−u ) = β2(−→u ) > c−→u can never turns out to be part of a
pure strategy equilibrium of the game. Indeed, player 2 has an incen-
tive to reduce slightly the price below β1(←−u ) and supply a residual de-
mand (D + L) > s2(c−→u ), that result in a profit Π2 (β1(
←−u )− ε,D + L) >
Π2 (β1(
←−u ), c−→u ) with ε small enough. Such a deviation is profitable for
firm 2 as long as β1(←−u ) > c−→u . The result is that no pure strategy equi-
libria exist with a market clearing price in one or both zones higher than
c−→u . Therefore, the only pure strategy equilibrium of the game ends with
a line never congested and a market clearing price at most c−→u . Under the
assumption of the validity of U.C. condition, the equilibrium allocation
is unique and given by 〈s∗1(p∗z); s∗2(p∗z); p∗z〉in definition 4.
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Case 2: Π1(P ,D − L) > Π1 (pz, s1(pz))
First notice that in this situation no pure strategy equilibrium exists. In
fact suppose player 1 wants to increase the clearing price in its zone
by offering its marginal unit at a price higher than c−→u . In this case,
the highest profit achievable by player 1 is given by Π1(P ,D − L) if
β1(
←−u ) = P (= p1) > β2(−→u )(= p2) and the zone separates or alterna-
tively, since s1(c−→u ) > (D−L), Π1
(
P , s1(c−→u )
)
> Π1(P ,D−L) if β1(←−u ) =
β2(
−→u ) = P = pC . Therefore, given the initial condition, a deviation to a
strategy that prices the marginal unit at the price ceiling is always prof-
itable for player1 and, moreover, the optimal response stated in proposi-
tion 6 shows that any attempts of player 1 to increase the price above c−→u
increase also the profit for player 2, that is Π2 (a, s2(a)) > Π2 (pz, s2(pz))
for any a > pz since s2(a) ≥ s2(pz). However, any strategy that asks
player 1 and player 2 to offer the price of their marginal unit at P with
probability 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium allocation. In fact both
players have always an incentive to cut (or, for player 1, to equalize) ri-
val’s price to increase the market share. To see this, let the marginal units
of 1 and 2 offered at β1 = β1 = P . The outcome function of the power
exchange assigns s1(c−→u ) to player 1, s2(c−→u ) to player 2 and clear the mar-
ket with the unique equilibrium price P . Now player 2 has an incentive
to set β2 = β1 − ε to increase its market share to (D + L) and, conse-
quently, congesting the line. In turn, now player 1 has an incentive to
offer its marginal unit at the same price of player 2 and decongesting the
line (remember priority rule 3 of the Power Exchange). This deviation
is profitable for player 2 as long as the market clearing price pC is higher
than c−→u . But at this last price Π1 (c−→u , s1(c−→u )) ≤ Π1 (pz, s1(pz)) and firm 1
has an incentive to price again its last unit at the price ceiling. The result
is that no pure strategy equilibrium exists for this case.
Second, if a mixed strategy equilibrium exists, this gives an expected
pay-off to player 1 equals to A1 > Π1 (pz, s1(pz)) and to player 2 equals
to A2 > Π1 (pz, s2(pz)). To see this notice that player 1 can assure itself a
profit at least equals to Π1(P ,D−L) by pricing its marginal unit at P with
probability equals to 1. The same profit is achievable by player 1 with a
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price P < P in the event that β1(u
′
) = P ≤ β2(u′′), where u′ and u′′ are
the marginal units of players 1 and 2, and the line is never congested. In
particular defines P the price such that Π1(P ,D − L) = Π1 (P , s1(c−→u )).
By elimination of dominated strategy player 1 is never going to price its
marginal unit at a price lower that P . Moreover notice that the alloca-
tion s1(pz) ≥ s1(c−→u ) implies that Π1
(
P ,D − L) = Π (P0, s1(pz)) for a
(c−→u ≤)P0 < P . The result is that any strategy that asks to player 1 to as-
sign randomly a price to its marginal unit included in the interval
[
P , P
]
gives it an expected payoff higher than Π1 (pz, s1(pz)). Equally, player 2
cannot gain from a randomization of its marginal offer at a value lower
than P . Therefore any strategy that asks to player 2 to assign randomly
a price to its marginal unit included in the interval
[
P , P
]
gives it an ex-
pected pay-off higher than Π2 (pz, s2(pz)). Finally the result of the ran-
domization implies one of the following situations: if β1(u
′
) > β2(u
′′
) the
final allocation ends up with a congestion of the power lines and zonal
prices p1 > p2 ≥ P , otherwise, if β1(u′) ≤ β2(u′′) the line will not be
congested and the unique price is some pC ≥ P .`
Appendix 6: Equilibrium Strategies and Allocations for
the case 0<L<D
In this Appendix the equilibrium solution and allocations of the game are
derived. Coherently with the characterization indicated in Proposition 7,
the solutions are reported for the two cases:
Case 1: Π1(P ,D − L) ≤ Π1 (pz, s1(pz))
In this situation it is never optimal for generator 1 to increase the price
on its marginal unit beyond c−→u .The application of the Algorithm pro-
posed in Appendix 3 shows that the best allocation for 1 is indicated
by the couple (pz, s1(pz)) with pz = cu for some (given proposition 6)
u ∈ [u,−→u ]. Any outcome equivalent strategy which result in this alloca-
tion is an equilibrium strategy for player 1. On the other hand, for player
2 any strategy which constraints the first (−→u − 1) units to the marginal
cost represents part of an equilibrium strategy. The unit −→u of generator
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2 must be priced in order to eliminate the incentive of player 1 to devi-
ate from his strategy. In fact if generator 2 sets a price for its marginal
unit −→u too high, generator 1 may find profitable to price its last unit the
same of its competitor. In this case, the demand of generator 1 would be
given by s1(c−→u ), the line will not be congested and the unique clearing
price in both zone would be higher than c−→u . So let P 0 ∈
[
c−→u , P
]
be a
price, if exists, such that Π1(P0, s1(c−→u )) = Π1 (pz, s1(pz)) and consider
the following strategies:
For generator i = 1 let
β∗1(u) =
{
pz ∀u ≤ −→u
cu ∀u > −→u
For generator 2 let
β∗2(u) =

cu ∀u < −→u
∈ [cu, P0] u = −→u
P ∀u > −→u
if P0 exists, otherwise
β∗2(u) = cu ∀u
It is easy to check that these strategies represent a couple of pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of the game, and the final allocation is unique when
(U.C.) holds. It is important to remind that there is also a mixed strat-
egy symmetric equilibrium of the game where both players randomize
between β∗1(u) with probability p and β∗2with probability (1− p).
The only equilibrium allocation results in no congestion on the grid
and equilibrium quantities and price given by O(β∗1(u), β∗2(u), Dt) =
{s∗1(p∗z); s∗2(p∗z); p∗z}.
Case 2: Π1(P ,D − L) > Π1 (pz, s1(pz))
From Proposition 7 there does not exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the game and the equilibrium, if exists, must be found in mized strat-
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egy. The first step is the determination of the equillibrium strategy for
the marginal units of the two players.
Consider first the equilibrium condition for player 2, and let P be the
price such that Π1 (P , s1(c−→u )) = Π1
(
P ,D − L). This value is given by
P =
P (D − L) + [C(s¯1)− C(D − L)]
s¯1
.
where s¯1 ≡ s1(c−→u ). From proposition 7,P represents the lower bound
of the randomization support for the two players. Player 2 will than
randomize the marginal price of its unit on
[
P , P
]
in order to make player
1 indifferent between any pure marginal price strategy in the support.
The condition for player 2’s mixed strategy is obtained from the expected
pay-off of player 1:
Pr [p2 < p] [p(D − L)− C(D − L)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Congestion
+ Pr[p2 ≥ p] [ps¯1 − C (s¯1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
NoCongestion
Again, from proposition 7, the expected pay-off of player 1 must be
equal to some A1 > Π1 (pz, s1(pz))which gives the condition for player
2:
F2(p) [p(D − L)− C(D − L)] + (1− F2(p)) [pD1 − C(s¯1)] = A1
and, after some rearrangement, to the probabilistic distribution:
F2(p) =
A1−[ps¯1−C(s¯1)]
p[(D−L)−s¯1]+[C(s¯1)−C(D−L)] with p ∈ [P , P ]
Now it must be that F ∗2 (P ) = 1, which implies that A1 = P (D−L)−
C(D − L). The distribution F2(p) can than be rewritten as:
F2(p) =
P (D − L)− ps¯1 + [C(s¯1)− C(D − L)]
p [(D − L)− s¯1] + [C(s¯1)− C(D − L)] with p ∈ [P , P ] (PD.2)
In order to generate an equilibrium, it must be verified that
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f2(p) =
[
P (s¯1 − (D − L))− [C (s¯1)− C (D − L)]
]
[p [(D − L)− s¯1] + [C (s¯1)− C (D − L)]]2
≥ 0
for any p ∈ [P , P ]which happens when
P ≥ C (s¯1)− C (D − L)
s¯1 − (D − L) (T.C.− 1)
At the limit
F2(P ) = 0 as P =
P (D−L)+[C(s¯1)−C(D−L)]
s¯1
.
consistently with the lower boundary of the randomization support.
Consider now the equilibrium condition for player 1. The latter will
randomize in order to let player 2 indifferent between any strategy
βu(c−→u ) included in the support
[
P , P
]
. By proposition 7, the play-off
of player 2 resulting from any pure strategy must be equal to some
A2 > Π2 (pz, s2(pz)), providing a condition for player 1:
Pr [p1 > p] [p(D + L)− C(D + L)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Congestion
+
+Pr[p1 ≤ p] [E(p1|p1 ≤ p) (s¯2)− C (s¯2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
NoCongestion
where
−→u−1∑
u=1
ku = DT − s¯1 ≡ s2 is the residual demand of generator 2
in the case the line is not congested and player 1 offer its last unit at a
price lower than the marginal unit of player 2. The condition for player
1 is than given by:
[1− F1(p)] [p(D + L)− C(D + L)]+F1(p) [E(p1|p1 ≤ p)s¯2 − C (s¯2)] = A2
that deriving for p can be written as
f1(p) =
[1− F1(p)] (D + L)
p [(D + L)− s¯2]− [C(D + L)− C(s¯2)]
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This differential equation can be solved by using a separation of vari-
ables. Call F1(p) = y and f1(p) = dydp . The above equation can be rewrit-
ten as:
(
1
D + L
)
dy
[1− y] =
dp
p [(D + L)− s¯2]− [C(D + L)− C(s¯2)]
taking the integral of both sides from the lower bound P to p yields:
(
1
D + L
) y(p)ˆ
y(P )
1
1− y dy =
pˆ
P
1
p [(D + L)− s¯2]− [C(D + L)− C(s¯2)]dp
⇐⇒ −
(
1
D+L
)
ln (1− y) |y(p)y(P ) =
=
(
1
(D+L)−s¯2
)
ln [p [(D + L)− s¯2]− [C(D + L)− C(s¯2)]] |pP
which after some rearrangements produces finally:
y(p) = F1(p) = 1−
[
p [(D + L)− s¯2]− [C(D + L)− C(s¯2)]
P [(D + L)− s¯2]− [C(D + L)− C(s¯2)]
]( D+L
s¯2−(D+L)
)
with p ∈ [P , P ] (PD.1)
Note that the value in brackets is always positive since (D + L) > s¯2
and p ≥ P > c−→u . At the lower bound of (PD.1) it holds that F1(P ) = 0
and the function is always increasing if
P >
C(D + L)− C(s¯2)
(D + L)− s¯2 (T.C.− 2)
Note that at the upper bound there must F1(P )→ 1 as P → +∞. This
requires a truncation of the density function in order to reconduct all
the probabilities inside the support of randomization. The probability
of player 1 to offer the marginal unit at a price included in the support[
P , P
]
so must be given by
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f1(p) =

−
(
(D+L)−s¯2
F (P )
)(
D+L
s¯2−(D+L)
)
×
×
[
p[(D+L)−s¯2]−[C(D+L)−C(s¯2)]
P [(D+L)−s¯2]−[C(D+L)−C(s¯2)]
]( D+L
s¯2−(D+L)−1
)
for p ∈ [P , P ]
0 otherwise
To summarize the mixed strategy equilibrium for the marginal unit
of the two players is given by the following distributions and conditions:
F ∗1 (p) = 1−
[
p[(D+L)−s¯2]−[C(D+L)−C(s¯2)]
P [(D+L)−s¯2]−[C(D+L)−C(s¯2)]
]( D+L
s¯2−(D+L)
)
(PD.1)
F ∗2 (p) =
P (D−L)−ps¯1+[C(s¯1)−C(D−L)]
p[(D−L)−s¯1]+[C(s¯1)−C(D−L)] (PD.2)
P ≥ C(s¯1)−C(D−L)s¯1−(D−L) (T.C.− 1)
P > C(D+L)−C(s¯2)(D+L)−s¯2 (T.C.− 2)
The above distributions generate an expected pay-off higher than the
constrained equilibrium of (PSP-L) in Definition 4. It is easy to see that,
for player 1 it is verified that
E(pi1) =
P´
P
[F ∗2 (p)pi1(p,D − L) + (1− F ∗2 (p))pi1 (p, s¯1)] f∗1 (p)dp =
P (D − L)− C(D − L) = A1 > Π1 (pz, s1(pz))
and for player 2
E(pi2) =
P´
P
[F ∗1 (p)E [pi2(p, s¯2)|p1 ≤ p] + (1− F ∗1 (p))pi2 (p,D + L)] f∗2 (p)dp =
A2 > Π2(pz, s2(pz))
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since (D + L) > s¯2 ≥ s2(pz) and P > pz .This is the straightforward
result of the generalization of Corollary2 to the case of randomization.
After having derived the equilibrium distributions for the marginal
prices submitted by the two players, similarly to the solution of the “Scan
Algorithm” for the case L > D, a pair of equilibrium strategies is given
by the following:
1. Player 1 will keep randomly a price p1 upon the support
[
P , P
]
ac-
cording to the probability distribution F ∗1 (p) and will play β∗1(u) =
pu for any u ∈ U
2. Player 2 will keep randomly a price p2 upon the suport
[
P , P
]
ac-
cording to the probability distribution F ∗2 (p). An equilibrium strat-
egy is given by β∗2(u) =

cu ∀u < −→u
p2 u =
−→u
P ∀u > −→u
Whenever p1 > p2 than the line will be congested and the equilibrium
outcome in this case is given by
O(β∗1(u), β∗2(u), D) = {(D − L, 0) ; (D,L) ; (p1,p2)}
On the contrary if p1 ≤ p2 the zones do not separate and a unique price
indicated by pC will result in equilibrium. The final allocation in this case
is given by
O(β∗1(u), β∗2(u), D) = {s¯1; s¯2; pC}
Equally to the previous case, it is important to remind the existence of
a mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium of the game where both players
randomize between β∗1(u) with probability p and β∗2 with probability (1−
p).
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